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INTRODUCTION 
This work is an attempt to describe British colonial policy in West 
Africa between 1885 and 1900. In this brief excursion, the author has two 
principal objectives. First, to provide a background for the pattern of 
British entry into West Africa. Second, to examine the pattern of British 
extension of political authority from the coast to the hinterland. 
The area known as West Africa extends from the River Senegal on the 
northwest of Africa to the Cameroons to the southeast. The former British 
West African Colonies are the Gambia, 1 Sierra Leone, Gold Coast (now Ghana), 
and Nigeria. All of these states are now independent except the Gambia 
which is yet awaiting independence. The colonies were acquired by the British 
Government at different periods of time: the Gambia (1765), Sierra Leone 
(1808), Gold Coast (1808), and Lagos, Nigeria (1861). 
These four countries are by no means a compact or uniform unit. On the 
contrary, they are separated from one another by stretches of coast. Between 
one country and the other are wedges of territory which were claimed by 
France, Germany, and Portugal. 
2 
Though these countries have certain geo- 
graphic characteristics in common, such as climate, vegetation, animal life, 
and others, each of them has a unique history of its own. The British method 
1 
There is no real significance other than usage and custom attached to 
the employment of the article "the" in such place names as the Gambia. The 
same custom applies to such names as The Hague or the Netherlands. 
2 
German possessions in West Africa (Togoland and the Cameroons) were 
placed under the United Nations after World War II. They are now independent. 
France and Portugal still retain some of their colonies in West Africa. 
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ii 
of acquisition, however, was quite similar in all of the countries. Notwith- 
standing their differences, a general treatment will be employed in examining 
British policy in these former colonies. A brief history of British penetra- 
tion into each of the colonies will, however, be given in subsequent chapters. 
On February 19, 1866, the four British colonies were brought under one 
Government with Sierra Leone as the headquarters. The Letters Patent which 
united these settlements stated, in part: 
We do hereby constitute on the ...West Coast of Africa one 
Government-in-Chief, which shall be called the Government of 
our West African Settlements, and shall, until otherwise 
provided by us, comprise our four Colonies [the Gambia, 
Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, and Nigeria] or Governments afore- 
mentioned under the respective,designations, and with the 
limits hereafter expressed....' 
In 1886 the Letters Patent were revoked and the Colonies were separated from 
one another to become independent colonies. 
The history of the conquest of every part of West Africa is in fact the 
story of the occupation of the coast and a gradual absorption of the 
interior. 
4 
The process of British expansion from the coast to the hinterland 
is the main theme of British relation with West Africa from 1885 to 1900. 
The penetration of the hinterland and the consequent establishment of 
political and administrative control over the colonies was a chequered one. 
Not only was such expansion accompanied with ruthless displacement of hither- 
to native chiefs and kings, it also marked the passing of indigeneous 
administration and cultural values. The direct government of the people by 
3 
Edward Hertslet, editor, Map of Africa by Treaty. London: Harrison & 
Sons, 1909, 1, 45. 
4 
Stephen H. Roberts, The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925. 
London: Frank Cass& Co., 1963, 302. 
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British officials working through native chiefs whose power and prestige had 
been considerably minimized. An examination of contemporary incidents 
(surveyed later) will reveal that British policy in West Africa between 1885 
and 1900 was directed principally towards the assumption of political control 
over the hitherto self-governing states. 
British connection with West Africa dates back to the sixteenth century 
when British merchants challenged Portuguese monopoly on the west coast of 
Africa. The Portuguese had enjoyed unchallenged sway in the slave traffic of 
West Africa. England, though a late comer in the slave trade scramble, gradu- 
ally but steadily assumed a preponderant share of the trade and eventually 
succeeded in squeezing out the Portuguese. Until 1885 the British connection 
with the West African states was limited to the coast. The "Old Coast 
System," as the dealing was described, meant that coastal chiefs brought the 
slaves from the hinterland and sold them to the Europeans at the coast. 
Nothing was known of the areas beyond the coast except weird tales of the 
benighted peoples and their savagery. To the British the peoples of Africa 
seemed to be extremely backward; therefore, little attempt was made to know 
about the people or the geography of the entire continent. 
5 
Not until the nineteenth century when the African rivers were explored, 
and their sources discovered, did any real interest in the "Dark Continent" 
grow among Europeans. The rivers of Africa, which became the highways of 
imperialism, were first discovered by Englishmen. The River Niger on the 
West Coast was discovered by Mungo Park (1795-1805) but its mystery was not 
solved until in 1830 the Lander brothers (John and Richard) discovered the mouth 
Margery Perham, Africans and British Rule. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1941, 15. 
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of the river. Shortly after the discovery of the rivers, of which the Niger 
was the most important, trade was established under the initiative of private 
merchants. Hence West Africa is often described as "Traders' Empire."6 "Like 
the tiny animalculae who labor in the bed of the ocean laying the foundations 
of those coral reefs," wrote Allan McPhee, "so the small traders in West 
Africa collaborated in the work of Empire-building. 7 The traders exchanged 
articles of trade, not with the native producers and consumers directly but 
through middlemen who brought the products from the interior to the coast. 
These middlemen, because of the lucrative nature of the trade, grew rich from 
the profits which accrued from their intermediary position. As a natural 
concomitant, they became important chieftains at the coast. It was through 
them that the merchants could gain access to the commodities from the 
interior. Their prestige among the native elements was significantly high. 
Thus, both the overseas merchants and native producers regarded them as use- 
ful agents who promoted trade. In fact, instead of considering them as 
impediments they were respectfully held as instruments without which trade 
would decline. Hence did the merchants vie one against the other in lobbying 
the middlemen by corrupting them with "dashes and "handshakes"--names 
applied to "gifts" (such as gin, whisky, and others) given to the middlemen 
or chiefs in order to buy their favor so that a particular merchant or group 
might enjoy a trade monopoly in some area. 
Before 1885, therefore, trade was one of the primary aims of the British 
merchants in West Africa. It was on their appeal that missionaries were sent 
6 
Allan McPhee, The Economic Revolution in British West Africa. London: 
George Routledge & Sons, 1926, 2. 
7 
Ibid. 
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out to Christianize the natives. Also on their request, the Imperial Govern- 
ment sent out administrative officials (Consuls) to protect British nationals 
and to secure peaceful trade. The officials were ostensibly to refrain from 
interfering in native affairs. Moral influence, through peaceful trade, was 
to be the guiding principle. Hence, in the words of the Conservative Prime 
Minister, Lord Salisbury, "Great Britain has adopted the policy of advance 
by commercial enterprise." 
8 
What Lord Salisbury meant was that trade, not 
territory was the primary objective of the British in advancing into West 
Africa. In an earlier letter to Lord Lyons, former Ambassador in Paris, 
Salisbury set the pattern for British advance. He wrote: 
....Actual authority we cannot exercise....The only form of 
control we have is that which is called moral influence,... 
In this we are still supreme....We must devote ourselves to 
the perfecting of this weapon. And, obviously, the first 
condition of its use is complete knowledge of what is going 
on. 
9 
The perfecting of this weapon implied that British officials "would 
have to pull the strings behind the scenes, but appear on the stage as little 
as possible" until an opportune time for them to assume the political control 
of the West African Colonies. In implementing the policy, the British 
officials succeeded in making treaties with native chiefs whereby the chiefs 
placed themselves under British protection and promised to open up trade. An 
example of such a treaty is valuable: 
8British and Foreign State Papers, 1892, LVI, 778. Lord Salisbury to 
Lord Dufferin, March 30, 1892. Lord Dufferin was the British Ambassador in 
Paris. 
9 
Lady Gwendolen Cecil, The Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury. London: 
Hodder& Stoughton, 1932, II, 355. Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons, July 15, 
1879. 
vi 
The chiefs of Ekoi agree and promise to refrain from entering 
into any correspondence, Agreement, or Treaty with any foreign 
nation or Power except with the knowledge and sanction of Her 
Britannic Majesty's Government. It is agreed that full and 
exclusive jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over British 
subjects and their property in the territory of Ekoi is 
reserved to Her Britannic Majesty, to be exercised by such 
Consular or other officers as Her Majesty shall appoint for 
that purpose.1° 
The treaty was monopolistic in tone. The chiefs who signed the treaty 
hardly understood (even though interpreters were available) what rights they 
were bartering away. In law they were the rulers of the land but the officials 
were the de facto controllers. Advance by commercial enterprise and the 
wielding of the weapon of moral influence proved to be more lasting and 
potent modes of expansion than force and conquest. This policy of moral 
influence was, however, modified in 1885. Between 1885 and 1900, force and 
military conquest were used to subjugate native rulers who resisted British 
entry into the interior of the colonies. In general, however, the story of 
British expansion in West Africa is an epic in which the "flag followed 
trade" instead of vice-versa. 
It is a fact that commerce formed the real foundation on which British 
greatness rested. Gladstone (the Liberal Prime Minister) in his speech on 
"Colonies and Colonization" delivered to the Mechanics Institute in 1885 
said: 
Commercial enterprise has been the mainspring of [British 
colonial] creation: Perhaps no other principle would have 
answered the purpose of forming large and permanqnt establish- 
ments, capable of becoming the nuclei of states.I1 
10 
British and Foreign State Papers, 1894-5, LXXXVII, 1042; LXXVI (1893 -4), 
66. 
11 
Paul Knaplund, Gladstone and British Imperial Policy. London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1927, 179. 
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Gladstone espoused the policy of pure commercial relations between the mother 
country and the colonies without the mother country attempting to take over 
the internal administration of the states. As Paul Knaplund said, "he clung 
to this idea throughout the rest of his life."12 Knaplund exaggerated. 
Gladstone was a complex personality. His good and humane intentions did not 
always correspond with his actions. 
13 
He valued colonies because they would 
afford "trade and employment" opportunities for the mother country. Conse- 
quently, he said, colonial enterprise would promote the "creation of so many 
happy Englands." 
14 
Trade and employment made available in the colonies would 
help to engender "the silken ties of love and affection between the mother 
country and the colonies. Subjection by military force, he argued, would 
hardly bring about any sentimental bond. Gladstone deplored the idea of 
annexing the colonies. He said: "Her Majesty's Government would not annex 
any territory, great or small, without the well-understood and expressed wish 
of the people to be annexed." 
15 
The paradox of Gladstone's noble ideals on 
the colonial question lay in his preaching one doctrine and practicing the 
opposite. It is quite ironic that it was under his regime that both Egypt 
and West Africa were acquired; not, as he said, with their well-understood 
and expressed wish. Hence, remarked G. T. Garratt, "Gladstone, as a public 
man, was a most subtle and difficult person, always modifying his ideas and 
304. 
12 
Ibid., 15. 
13 
G. T. Garratt, The Two Mr. Gladstones. London: Macmillan & Co., 1936, 
14K 
naplund, Gladstone and British Imperial Policy, 202. 
15 
Hansard Parliamentary Debates, June 25, 1872, 3rd Series, CCXII, 217. 
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repeatedly shaking new patterns in the Parliamentary kaleidoscope." 16 Instead 
of clinging firmly to his cherished ideals, Gladstone did frequently permit 
himself to be manipulated by the events of the time. In Garratt's words, 
Gladstone "sought his inspiration from without and deliberately allowed him- 
self to be swayed by ...the Zeitqeist."17 
In outlining its colonial policy in West Africa after 1885, the British 
Government, whether under Liberal or Conservative administration, emphasized 
the philanthropic and economic factors as the driving motives for the hinter- 
land penetration. The Government has never given its real motive for the 
persistence with which it pursued the policy of interior expansion from 1885 
to 1900. Rather, the often misleading and overemphasized reason was the 
desire for trade and the improvement of the social conditions of the native 
trade. Certainly these two motives were 
but sidelights to some other motive--the extension of British political 
authority on the west coast of Africa. Philanthropy and commercial enter- 
prise were not the impelling motives for persistent British endeavor to 
penetrate into the hinterland of West Africa. If the commercial factor had 
been the primary incentive, the undertaking would have been abandoned, in 
keeping with British pragmatic politics. In 1885, commercial returns from 
the West African Colonies became increasingly meager. In 1884, for instance, 
the total value of the exports into West Africa (the Gambia, Sierra Leone, 
Gold Coast, and Nigeria) was 
.£ 199,483; whereas in 1885 the total value of 
16 
Garratt, vi. 
17 
Ibid., viii. 
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exports was only £119,385. 18 The Government wanted to achieve its aim by 
degrees through commerce, philanthropy, and moral influence. The inner motive 
of political aggrandizement was never expressed by the Government, but, in 
fact, the assumption of political control over the native peoples of West 
Africa was the ne plus ultra achievement of British policy in West Africa 
(1885-1900). One might therefore agree with Norman Harris that "the British 
Colonial Office seemed to know its mind; but it was 'afraid to take in hand 
any definite policy.'" 19 The policy of hinterland expansion, however, was 
intensified by international rivalries on the west coast of Africa between 
1882 and 1885. Nevertheless, the British Government could achieve its goal 
of political control by fraudulent removal of the native chiefs and kings 
thus establishing British political administration over the entire settle- 
ments. 
18 
The State 
Macmillan & Co., 
(U.S.). See The 
sman's Year-Book: Statistical and Historical. London: 
1887, 293. One British pound sterling was equal to $4.86,4 
World Almanac. New York: Press Publishing Co., 1893, 67. 
19 
Norman D. 
Houghton Mifflin 
Harris, Intervention and Colonization in Africa. New York: 
Co., 1914, 9. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE PERIOD OF "INDIFFERENCE" 
One of the pivotal principles of the Victorians regarding colonies was 
that colonies must be self-supporting. By the middle of the nineteenth 
century, this principle failed in its practical application. Parliament and 
public opinion had declared that financial responsibility in the administra- 
tion and defense of the colonies should devolve on the colonies themselves. 
In 1865, however, the Imperial Government was spending not less than 4:320,000 
per annum on the West African Settlements. 1 The increasing financial burden 
on the British taxpayer for the defense of the colonies became, therefore, 
decidedly unpleasant. As this was a "tax-hating" age, any improvident and 
useless expenditure which would involve increases in taxes was tenaciously 
resisted. If the colonies were not self-financing, it was felt, 
...the dominant country can rarely succeed in compelling or 
inducing a dependency to contribute to the expenses of the 
supreme government; and, consequently, the dominant country 
generally defrays from its own resources the expenses caused 
by the protection of the dependency in peace and war....It 
may be added, that the possession of the dependency often 
proves a powerful incentive to improvident and useless 
expenditure on the part of the supreme government.2 
Added to the vexing problem of financial responsibility resting on the 
Treasury and indirectly on the taxpayer, was the disturbing decline in West 
1Sir Alan Pim, The Financial and Economic History of the African 
Tropical Territories. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940, 22. 
2,Quoted in Klause E. Knorr, British Colonial Theories, 1570-1850. 
Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1944, 351. 
2 
African trade. The average value of exports and imports (in £000's) from 
1856-1860 was 1915,000, whereas from 1861-65 the average fell to J5664,000.3 
The expansion of commerce was looked upon as an essential factor in the exten- 
sion of British influence. Disillusionment came gradually as the trade 
returns from the colonies fell considerably. The revenue derived from the 
commercial enterprise formed a negligible proportion of British economy. 
4 
The 
potentialities of the colonies in regard to trade did not therefore appear 
promising enough. 
The commercial crisis syncronized with the period of the anti-imperialism 
campaign; 
5 
the policy of the Government was therefore to withdraw from these 
"irritating hostages of fortune."6 As a result of the various problems in 
West Africa, the House of Commons appointed a Select Committee to examine and 
report how far local government in West Africa had succeeded in encouraging 
and protecting trade. Also, the Committee was to devise a plan for making the 
colonies self-supporting "without impairing efficiency." After conducting the 
inquiry the Committee resolved: 
That all further extension of territory or assumption of 
Government, or new Treaties offering any protection to native 
tribes, would be inexpedient; and that the object of our 
policy should be to encourage in the natives the exercise of 
those qualities which may render possible for us more and 
3 
McPhee, "Appendix A." 
4 
John Hobson, "Imperialism: A Study," The New Imperialism. Boston: 
D. C. Heath & Co., 1961, 9. 
5 
C. A. Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism. London: 
Heinemann, 1960, 32-75; 79-89. 
6 
Roland Robinson, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny, Africa and the 
Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism. London: Macmillan & Co., 
1961, 30. (Hereafter referred to as Robinson.) 
3 
more to transfer to them the administration of all the Govern- 
ments, with a view to our ultimate withdrawal from all, except, 
probably, Sierra Leone.7 
The resolution to withdraw from the West African Settlements was 
governed by a tradition of frugality on the part of Parliament. It wanted 
colonies but no expenses. The influence of the Manchester School whose 
adherents had a bias against colonies because of the financial strain 
involved in maintaining them was still strong. Any enterprise which would 
strain Parliament's purse-strings to a breaking point was vehemently opposed. 
Even as late as 1866 the Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote: 
Recall the African squadron; give up the settlements on 
the west coast, and we shall make a saving which will, at the 
same time, enable us to build ships and have a good budget. 
What is more, we shall have accomplished something definite, 
tangible, for the good of the country. In these days, more 
than ever, people look to results.8 
All that the resolution proposed, in effect, was that "Britain should cut her 
colonial losses and concentrate on the more profitable regions where the gains 
of trade were not cancelled by the liabilities of rule."9 
The report of the Select Committee had hardly been declared before it 
was nullified. Such "vulgar prejudice" for territorial abandonment was not to 
be as easy as that. Parliament, ironically enough, genuflected before the 
pressure of some civil servants, missionaries and merchants. These agents of 
7 
British Sessional Papers, House of Commons, 1865, V, 3. (Hereafter 
referred to as British Sessional Papers.) 
8 George Earle Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli. London: Macmillan 
Co., 1929, IV, 476. For a full discussion on British attitude towards the 
West African Colonies see David Kinley, ed., The Fiscal and Diplomatic 
Freedom of the British Overseas Dominions. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1922, 
chs. V and VI. 
9 Robinson, 30. 
4 
imperialism protested against what they termed "Little Englandism of Downing 
Street." In short, the West African Settlements were not abandoned. Pene- 
tration was continued. The traditional pragmatic politics of the Government- - 
of concentrating attention where prospects of profits appeared bright, and 
jettisoning concerns whose future looked gloomy--was not adopted in this 
case. 
The report of the Committee, evidently, did not represent the British 
Government's attitude towards West Africa. The document merely reflected 
the views of those members of the House who were not merely 
sciolists in West African affairs but reflected in their 
opposition to expansion a widespread view of imperial policy; 
...withdrawal whenever possible and retrenchment of expendi- 
ture everywhere.1° 
The emphasis placed on the report was not so much on withdrawing as on 
economy. The Committee was certainly composed of "those whose mental horizon 
was bounded by the academic teachings of the Manchester School," but who 
failed to perceive the political implications. 
In any case, it would be erroneous to assume that national policies are 
made or shaped by parliamentary debates or recommendations. On the contrary, 
British colonial policies were often shaped by exchange of correspondence 
between the Prime Minister and his Cabinet members responsible for colonial 
affairs. The thesis is a simple one. The British Government had a definite 
policy; but it was temporarily reluctant to implement it until some auspicious 
moment arrived. To appreciate this fact, it is helpful to know the minds of 
British policy-makers. The answers given to the Committee by Mr. William H. 
Wylde, who was the Head of the Slave Trade Department in the Foreign Office 
10 
K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885. Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1956, 166. 
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for ten years, will make clear the issue at stake: that political control of 
the colonies dominated the minds of those who shaped the national policy. 
Q. Has it not been the case, and is it not almost inevitable, that 
a great power like England, assuming the Government in such a 
country like West Africa, must maintain certain native powers 
against the others? 
A. Exactly; you cannot help that. 
Q. Should you say that for the interest of commerce and civilization 
it would have been almost better not to have so interfered, but 
to have left the natives to fight it out among themselves so 
that the strongest would finally become predominant? 
A. Probably that might be the best thing; but if you have an 
(commercial) establishment in some place, you cannot help 
interfering in the politics of the country .11 
The motive for British penetration in West Africa from 1885 to 1900 was 
not primarily economic but fundamentally political-Oberhoheit, as Mary 
called it. 12 That is, "the power to rule at the top of things, the 
power to enforce peace among peoples,...to be king over kings, ruler over 
many peoples. "13 This was the unexpressed inner motive. The thesis is 
supported by contemporary evidence--the policy of removing native rulers and 
replacing them with British Consuls or Commissioners. 
When Gladstone took office as Liberal Prime Minister in 1880, he stuck 
firm to his principle of non-territorial annexation. The purpose of colonies, 
he said, should not be "the administrative connection, and the shadow of 
11 
British Sessional Papers, 1865, V, 412, QQ. 2713-15. 
12M ary H. Kingsley, West African Studies. London: Macmillan & Co., 
1901, 436. 
13 
Ibid. 
6 
political subordination' ..14 Territorial aggrandizement, he stressed, was 
not a legitimate object of ambition. His arguments reinforced the old 
prejudice against colonies in general. Annexations, he said, increase the 
burden of Government and the Government from year to year groans over the 
mass of work left undone. 
15 
"The lust and love of territory have been 
among the greatest curses of mankind," Gladstone argued. He hated the idea 
of building "coloured" empires for the sake of empire-building. What Glad- 
stone desired was the self-determination of the dependencies while the 
sentimental attachment was maintained. In 1882 he declared: 
Throughout the whole of my political life, whether under Sir 
Robert Peel or as a Member of the Liberal Party, I cannot 
recollect an occasion on which I gave a vote or took a step 
in a controverted matter except on the side which was opposed 
to annexation.16 
Gladstone's reluctance to annex, however, was by no 
control or influence. He said, "we ought to reduce, not our political 
influence, but our power over the Colonies to a minimum." 17 Instances of 
Gladstone's denunciation of annexation policies can be multiplied. They 
are of little value. As has been said, "there is plenty of what is purely 
artificial in the political classification of men." Gladstone's pious and 
humane effusions are impressive but their application is another matter. 
In his cabinet, of course, Gladstone had men who had sympathy for some 
14William 0. Aydelotte, Bismarck and British Colonial Policy, 1883-1885. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1937, 6. 
15_ 
mansard Parliamentary Debates, June 25, 1872, 3rd Series, CCXII, 25. 
16 
Hansard Parliamentary Debates, March 17, 1882, 3rd Series, CCLXVII, 
1190. 
17 
Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy, 61. 
7 
of his views. Lord Selborne, the Lord Chancellor, for example, "'had a very 
strong feeling against the tendency of European nations to appropriate and 
occupy countries inhabited by uncivilized or imperfectly civilized races, as 
if their inhabitants had no rights.'" 
18 
On the other hand, however, Glad- 
stone had strong opponents from the radical wing (imperialists) of the Cabi- 
net. Sir Charles Dilke and Joseph Chamberlain were incongruous elements in 
his cabinet. Both represented what might be called the "new imperialism." 
Dilke glorified in the triumph of Saxondom--the triumph of English laws and 
English principles of government--"essential to the freedom of mankind." 19 
As for Chamberlain, England's rights and interests were to be protected under 
all circumstances and never hawked away--not a policy of peace at any price. 
The dominant issue in his mind was British prestige. An excerpt from his 
to a political colleague, Lord Morley, December 24, 1885, unkernels 
his mind. 
...I am sure you will not mind my writing frankly my opinions.... 
The time has come when we ought to know and say exactly what 
we mean--and if we do not know, we ought to remain silent.... 
The time will come, and probably soon when our differences of 
opinion must be made public....For the present I must lie low, 
and try not to commit myself, but I will not be dragged--even 
by Mr. Gladstone--into a policy the result of which I believe 
would be fatal to the greatness and influence of the country .20 
In the main, the influence of Gladstone over his colleagues was still strong 
by early 1882, but it was appreciably diminishing all the same due to certain 
political circumstances. 
18 
Aydelotte, 7. 
19Sir Charles Dilke, Greater Britain. London: Macmillan II Co., 1868, 
219James L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain. London: Macmillan 
8. Co., 1933, II, 147. 
565. 
8 
The "Scramble" for Africa beginning in the early 1880's, seriously 
altered Gladstone's policy toward West Africa. The period after 1882 when 
England occupied Egypt marked the end of an era of indifference and "wise 
silence" over the West African Settlements. As early as 1881 France and 
Germany had challenged British hegemony in West Africa. The French especially 
were active in Senegambia (between Senegal and Gambia) and were trying to 
engulf the British settlements of Gambia and Sierra Leone. The British 
Government was prepared to allow the French an "open door" in the Gambia 
because of its little commercial value. As for Sierra Leone, it was in no 
better shape than the Gambia economically. The Governor reported the decline 
of the commerce of Freetown. 21 The merchants of Liverpool and London trading 
in the Gambia and Sierra Leone appealed to the Government to save the hinter- 
lands from French invasion. Gladstone at this time did not think it expedient 
to interfere or to proclaim the areas "British Protectorates." He bided his 
time. Apart from the fact that intervention would involve heavy military 
expenditure, of which he felt these areas could not stand the strain, 
22 
Gladstone was aware of the diplomatic risk involved. Such intervention, he 
thought, would strain the good relations between France and England. It 
would thus torpedo the Anglo-French modus vivendi in Egypt. Chamberlain even 
at this time admitted that England could not set up a colonial monopoly on 
the west coast. "If foreign nations are determined to pursue distant 
colonial enterprises," he said, "we have no right to prevent them. We cannot 
21 
British Sessional Papers, 1890-1, LV, 161. 
22 
Ibid. 
9 
anticipate them in every case by proclaiming a universal protectorate. 23 
Gladstone, himself, did not favor such a Monroe Doctrine in West Africa. 
The Germans, too, were entering the colonial race in southwest Africa- - 
in the Cameroons. This area had previously been rejected by the British; 
hence Gladstone did not care too much about German claims over in Angra 
Pequena. Chamberlain aid not consider the Germans much of a threat. He 
recognized, of course, the value of the Cameroons to England. Dilke was not 
happy with Bismarck's seizure of the Cameroons but he admitted that German 
annexation was "not a bad thing for us;" it was "preferable to a French" 
seizure. On the whole, Gladstone's Government encouraged both the French and 
the German aspirations on the west coast just to divert their attention from 
Egypt and the Nile. England and France had agreed not to interfere in each 
other's spheres of influence--a standstill agreement of non-territorial 
annexation. As long as matters remained as they were, the West African 
problem was shelved. 
But, what Harry Johnston described as "the spontaneous result of cir- 
cumstance" caused a snap in the Anglo-French collaboration. The collapse of 
the Anglo-French entente in Egypt affected their relations in West Africa. 
Late in 1882 the British occupied Egypt. Hence, "it was the British invasion 
of Egypt which shattered...the general Anglo-French collaboration. "24 British 
action in Egypt exacerbated French feeling against the English. Consequently, 
France adopted a policy of pin-pricks in West Africa. She suspected that 
23 
Charles W. Boyd, ed., Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches. New York: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1914, I, 136. Speech at Birmingham, January 5, 1885. 
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4Robinson, 166. 
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Britain was then driving for an African Empire. The hitherto agreed modus 
vivendi was out of the question. Almost immediately France began to press on 
the Lower Niger. In an attempt to challenge Britain's preponderant position 
on the west coast, France entered the race of treaty-making with native 
rulers. Added to this, she began a campaign to convert her areas of influence 
into a unity. "France, for the first time," remarked Roberts, "proceeded to 
general definition of her African possessions." 25 
In the Delta of the Congo, too, the French and Belgium challenged 
British trade. To distract the British Government further, the French 
minister, Ferry, appealed to Bismarck to join in the resistance to British 
West African control. In this he had hooked a very big fish. The overture 
was well-received. It came at a time when "the colonial question in Germany 
had taken a hold on the sentiment People." Bismarck himself 
had his grievances against British policy for British colonial procedure 
"was extremely irritating to Lhim]. "26 So a Franco-German pressure brought 
a far-reaching change in the British policy of temporary indifference to 
territorial acquisition on the west coast of Africa. The British Government 
had then to "face the altered circumstances." 
Under the pressure of international rivalry in West Africa, the dis- 
tracted Gladstone Cabinet felt that action to forestall French and German 
encroachments had become urgent. Official commitment seemed inevitable. 
Though Gladstone had abjured colonial annexation without the free and expressed 
consent of the people who were being annexed, he eventually concurred in 
25 
Roberts, 303. 
26 
Aydelotte, 4. 
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"whatever is best in our time." The action taken by the Government was clear 
and specific: "to establish an efficient Consular Staff in the Niger and Oil 
Rivers Districts" 
27 
where British interest had been predominant. The Consuls 
were to make treaties with native chiefs and induce them to accept British 
protection; 28 that is, "to prevent the possibility of our trade being inter- 
fered with." Consul E. Hewett was to checkmate the action of the Germans in 
the Cameroons in treaty-making; but, on July 14, 1884, "the occupation of the 
Cameroons became official with the raising of the German flag in several 
towns of the new protectorate. "29 One week later Mr. Hewett arrived, too 
late to forestall the Germans, hence the nickname "Too Late Hewett." 
The "Scramble" for possession of territory on the west coast of Africa 
was then in full swing. Though Gladstone did not consider the Germans as 
serious rivals as the French, he would not, at the same time, allow himself 
"to be bullied" by the chancellor's threats. Bismarck had appealed to the 
British Government for negotiations on the colonial question. For six 
months there was no reply. This tardiness on the part of the British Govern- 
ment irritated Bismarck. On September 1, 1884, Lord Granville (Colonial 
Secretary) in a letter to Mr. Gladstone informed him that "Bismarck is very 
27 
The "Oil Rivers District" was the vast Niger Delta between Lagos and 
the Cameroons--so-called because of the replacement of the slave trade by the 
oil trade on the Delta. The areas included are Benin, Escarvos, Warri, 
Forcados, Brass, St. Nicholas, St. Barbara, St. Bartholomew, Sambrero, New 
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Cross, and Old Calaboar. E. Hertslet, M22 of Africa by Treaty. London: 
Harrison & Sons, 1909, I, 155. 
28 
Robinson, 171. 
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Arthur Horton Cook, British Enterprise in Nigeria. Philadelphia: 
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IV--"International Rivalry." 
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angry" and would probably give "the Mandate of Europe to France."3° Glad- 
stone replied on September 2, 1884: "Bismarck's fuming does not much alarm 
me. Turkey and Italy would be fair allies against a mandate to France; nor 
am I sure that Russia would join in it." 
31 Gladstone, however, was "sorry" 
that delay "may lead to perplexity." By September 24, 1884, Bismarck had not 
received any answer from the British Government. Count Herbert Bismarck, 
Bismarck's son and Ambassador in England, put it to Lord Granville that 
"repeated proofs of the insincere attitude of the English Cabinet would force 
us to look elsewhere for support. "32 
Bismarck took advantage of the diplomatic difficulties in which Great 
Britain was involved and the exposed situation of France to control the 
action of both. He carefully guarded against furnishing both with a common 
cause against Germany. While he was imperious toward Great Britain, his 
correspondence with France was quite conciliatory. He broached to M. de 
Courcel, the French Minister at Berlin, the question of the freedom of 
navigation of the Congo and the Niger and of convening an international 
conference to this end. 
33 
He suggested that the United States, Great 
Britain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain be invited to take 
part in the deliberations. The suggestion made by Bismarck was agreed to 
by France. Having been denied the "open door" on the Niger, France felt that 
30 Agatha Ramm, editor, The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone 
and Lord Granville. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, II, 241. 
31 
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a prospect was now opened to her to enjoy the coveted privilege of equal 
treatment on the Niger. It was on the concurrence of both Governments (France 
and Germany) that the international conference known as the "Berlin Confer- 
ence" was convened. Information was issued from Berlin to other European 
Powers. Britain accepted the invitation. The matters to be discussed were 
specific: first, the question of freedom of commerce in the basin and at the 
mouth of the Congo; second, the application to the Congo and the Niger of 
the principles adopted at the Congress of Vienna (freedom of navigation on 
several international rivers); and third, the establishment of formalities to 
be observed in order to render effective future occupation on the west coast 
of Africa. Though the questions to be discussed involved collective interests 
of a number of states, they were more particularly vital to Germany. 
Diplomatic in form, it was economic in fact; ostensibly 
international in its bearing, in truth it concerned but 
one nation; and it was designed to help to solve for that 
nation only, a strictly social problem.34 
It was perhaps the popular public opinion in favor of colonies and the fear 
of French revanche of the events of 1870 that eventuated Bismarck's interest 
in the colonial question. As A. J. P. Taylor correctly observed, Bismarck's 
sudden interest in colonies was more than a mere change of mind. It was a 
purposeful policy, deliberate in design, and executed with the rare diplomatic 
skill so clearly exemplified by the Iron Chancellor. 35 
The Conference met at Berlin on November 15, 1885. Almost all important 
states of Europe, except Switzerland and Greece, were represented. The 
United States' delegation also sat with other European Powers in a diplomatic 
34 
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3 
5A. J. P. Taylor, Germany's First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885. London: 
Macmillan & Co., 1938, passim. 
14 
conference in Europe. Prince Bismarck was the chairman of the conference. 
The conference went to work immediately on the issues that were presented to 
it. According to DeLeone, "the rapidity with which it disposed of these 
points showed that the principal part of its labors was accomplished before 
it had met." 
36 
The rapidity with which a common accord was reached did not, 
however, exclude elaborate discussion or controversy. The question of 
applying the principles adopted at the Congress of Vienna to the Niger was 
strongly resisted by the British delegation. British objection to control 
by an international commission on the Niger was upheld by the Russian 
delegate, Count Kapnist, who, DeLeone described as the "watch-dog of the 
conference" because of his independent position.3 
7 
It was due to the sound- 
ness of his arguments, DeLeone affirmed, that the General Act of the Confer- 
ence was purged of all generalizations and the Niger subjected to a different 
regimen. 
The decisions of the Conference were embodied in General Acts of the 
Conference. The Acts were later ratified by all the states except the United 
States and the ratification was deposited at the Berlin Foreign Office. 
Articles 13 and 26 of the General Act provided for freedom of navigation of 
the Congo and the Niger respectively. While the enforcement of the Act on 
the navigation of the Congo was to be the responsibility of an international 
commission, the enforcement on the Niger was to be undertaken by Britain and 
France in their own spheres of the Niger (Articles 30 and 31). The "Act of 
Navigation on the Niger" stated: 
36 
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The navigation of the Niger, without excepting any of its 
branches or outlets, is and shall remain entirely free for 
the merchant ships of all nations equally, whether with cargo 
or in ballast, for the transportation of goods and passengers. 
It shall be regulated by the provisions of this Act of Naviga- 
tion, and by the Rules to be made in pursuance of this Act.33 
An important provision of the Berlin Act was article 35 which empowered 
the competitors for territories on the west coast of Africa to protect their 
existing rights in the territories hitherto occupied on the coast. The Act 
stated: 
The Signatory Powers of the Present Act recognize the obliga- 
tion to insure the establishment of authority in regions 
occupied by them on the coast of the African Continent suf- 
ficient to protect existing rights, and, as the case may be, 
freedom of trade and of transit under the conditions agreed 
upon.39 
It was this provision of "effective occupation" that made the British Govern- 
ment proclaim Lower Niger, where her interest British 
Protectorate. So, remarked Harris, "Great Britain, at length, under the 
pressure of these French and German activities, realized the necessity of a 
definite policy of expansion in West Africa, and of marking out promptly the 
future field of her operations."4° In effect, the Lower Niger was recognized 
as being a British sphere of influence and the Upper Niger was regarded as a 
French sphere. 
38 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ERA OF CONTINENTAL EXPANSION 
For some decades, the British had made repeated attempts to penetrate 
the hinterland (that is, the interior beyond the coast) of the four British 
colonies on the west coast of Africa. Such attempts proved unsuccessful 
because of the incessant resistance and hostility of the natives and the 
impregnable impediments posed by nature--unfavorable climate of the West 
Coast and lack of good roads. The period from 1885 to 1900 could then be 
regarded as a watershed in British colonial policy in West Africa. The year 
1885 marked the end of British "indifference" and hesitation about a definite 
involvement in colonial annexation on the west coast of Africa. The period, 
in fact, opened up a new chapter in the Anglo-West African relations--the 
era of Continental Expansion. 1 The term "continental expansion" signifies 
the penetration of the hinterland of West Africa, the extension of British 
administration beyond the coast, and the building of roads, railways, 
harbors, and other means of communication for the promotion of British 
trade and administration. 
It was indicated earlier that British slowness and apparent reluctance 
to annex territories on the west coast of Africa was not due to lack of 
interest. On the contrary, Britain abjured territorial annexation on the 
ground that the keeping of the colonies involved a heavy financial burden. 
This reason for refusing to annex more territory did not explain the real 
'McPhee, 4. 
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fact. The economic factor was not the major reason for territorial self- 
denial. The crucial and patent fact was that British supremacy on the west 
coast of Africa was not challenged to such a degree that it demanded her 
taking immediate action to defend her colonial interests in these areas. 
When, between 1882 and 1885, the French and Germans challenged British 
hegemony on the west coast by claiming territories in what had been safely a 
British sphere of influence, Britain at last started to modify her colonial 
policy in West Africa. Lord Salisbury's speech in the House of Commons in 
1890 supported this view. He said: 
Up to ten years ago we remained masters of Africa, practically, 
or the greater part of it, without being put to the inconvenience 
of protectorates or anything of that sort, by the simple fact 
that we were masters of the sea....So much was that the case 
that we left enormous stretches of coast to the native rulers 
in full confidence that they would go on under native rulers 
and in the hope that they would gradually acquire their own 
proper civilization without any interference. 
Then suddenly, we found out that that position however 
convenient, had no foundation in international law....2 
It was therefore no more a case of leaving the people to themselves to 
shape their own destiny. Outside forces contributed to the British Govern- 
ment's adopting a new colonial policy in West Africa. It would be inexpedi- 
ent, the Government felt, to stand in silent acquiescence while other Powers 
pegged out territories on the west coast. Hence the British Government 
abandoned the old policy of non-annexation. British hesitation in annexing 
colonies in West Africa could also be explained by the complexity of the 
governmental process for the approval of foreign policies. For a really 
important measure of policy, the Cabinet had to give its approval. On many 
2 
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occasions, the views of many of the members of the Cabinet varied widely. 
This method of procedure in foreign affairs was a serious impediment to quick 
action. Lord Salisbury realized this difficulty when, in 1886, he wrote to 
Queen Victoria: 
There is much else that weakens our diplomacy--our shifting 
foreign policy during the last ten years--our precarious 
Governments, the necessity of adapting our foreign policy to 
the views of a Cabinet of fourteen or sixteen mep, usually 
ignorant of it and seldom united in their views. 
One unfortunate aftermath of the Berlin Conference was "an intensifica- 
tion of the race for empire" on the west coast of Africa. The English, the 
French, and the Germans were seriously campaigning for possessions on the 
west coast in 1885. Gladstone noted in his diary that the year was "a time 
of Sturm and Dranq. "4 This was so. The French and the Germans were pressing 
from the Upper Niger and the Cameroons respectively. The members of Glad- 
stone's Cabinet stood for a positive, forward policy in West Africa. What 
Gladstone feared was that a mishandling of the colonial issue could lead to 
the division and possible break up of the Cabinet and the solidarity of the 
party as a whole. In a letter to Lord Granville on January 22, 1885, Glad- 
stone wrote: "I admit that from various symptoms it is not improbable there 
may be a plan or intention to break up the party."5 The majority of the 
Cabinet recognized the terms of the Berlin Conference as having given the 
British Government a semblance of effective occupation on the Lower Niger. 
Granville and some other Radicals were anxious to safeguard the Lower Niger 
3 
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for the "extension of official control." 
6 
Gladstone seemed to have no 
alternative but to abide by popular opinion. By Orders in Council of March 
26, 1885, the British Government proclaimed the Oil Rivers Districts a British 
Protectorate. 
7 
The proclamation was followed by effective occupation. 
Administrative officials were sent out with instructions to open up trade, 
stop the slave trade, and make treaties with native chiefs. The political 
authority of the officials was so extensive that local rulers who opposed 
the intrusion of the British were at the mercy of the administrators. 
8 
Local 
chiefs who resisted the new administrative authority were to be tried by the 
British Government officials and, if found uncompromising, deposed. Sir 
Harry Johnston, later a Vice-Consul on the Oil Rivers, was sent out to survey 
the potentialities of the hinterland. His report was full of romance and 
prospects. He was "struck" with the "beauty" and magnificent vegetation of 
the Oil Rivers Districts and hoped that the area "might become a 'white city' 
in course of time." 9 The delimitation of the geographical boundary of the 
Protectorate was delayed until June of the same year. In pursuance of the 
new policy of colonial expansion, the government staked their interest accord- 
ing to priorities. The Lower Niger appeared potentially more attractive than 
other areas on the coast. "Here," Robinson said, "was the region with the 
best trade. Here was the best waterway into the interior. Here lay the best 
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opportunity of breaking the power of the African middlemen." 
10 
In the meantime, however, the French were pressing forward from the 
Upper Niger, from the Ivory Coast, and from Dahomey into the Gold Coast 
(regions north of Ashanti). 11 British merchants requested protection of 
their commerce from the home Government. The government, though not totally 
indifferent to her interests in the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and the Gold 
Coast, did not intervene immediately in response to the appeals of merchants. 
It adopted a "good neighbor policy" calculated at obviating potential Euro- 
pean war. To the south of the region of the Lower Niger, administrative 
agents under the leadership of the Consul-General explored the entire area 
and negotiated treaties with the natives. The area north of the Lower Niger, 
however, where the National African Company had been trading for some decades, 
was left to the management of the Company. The Company had in 1881 applied 
for a royal charter to administer the hinterland of the Lower Niger but was 
refused by the government. Sir Taubman Goldie, 
12 
the heart and soul of the 
Company, boasted that "energetic and unceasing political work was at the root 
of success." His economic enterprise was fused with political groundwork 
which was later to be exploited by the Government. 
In 1882 when international rivalry raged in West Africa, Goldie tried 
to induce the Imperial Government to declare the hinterland of the Lower 
Niger occupied. The suggestion was turned down and to the government he was 
10 
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no more than "a reckless and expendable intruder." By 1884, as the "Scramble" 
for territories on the west coast of Africa became feverishly serious, Goldie 
emerged as a man of consequence to the policy-makers. He warned the Govern- 
ment about the new threat to British interests: stating that "it would be 
suicidal to abandon to a rival power the only great remaining undeveloped 
opening for British goods." The best way of keeping his monopoly in the 
hinterland lay in his company's seizing political control of the area--thus 
laying the foundations of future British Empire in Nigeria. The Foreign 
Office considered it a better method of expansion to entrust Goldie's Company 
with the power of administration rather than for the Government to exercise 
direct rule. An Assistant Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, Villiers 
Lister, wrote: 
[The Company] ...is perfectly able to discharge the duties of 
administration for which H[er] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] have become 
responsible, and unless it sh[oul]d go to the great expense of 
setting up the machinery of gov[ernmen]t upon the two rivers 
where the Co[mpany] now rules supreme, there seems to be no 
other course open, and certainly no better one, than that of 
legalizing and affirming the position of the Co[mpany] and plac- 
ing the business of administration into its hands.13 
Such an argument was comforting to the parsimonious Gladstone who could quiet 
his conscience by transferring government business to a Company that would pay 
the expenses. On February 12, 1885, the Company submitted a formal applica- 
tion for a grant of royal charter. Later a rather seductive picture of the 
inland regions was submitted to the Government. The prospects seemed promis- 
ing. Lord Aberdare, Governor of the Royal Niger Company, wrote to the 
Colonial Secretary, Lord Granville, that the prospects were "not only probable 
13 Quoted from Robinson, 180-182. Memo by Villier Lister, January 30, 
1885, F.O. 84/1879. 
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but certain that their existing trade, large as it is, will speedily be 
developed in proportions and directions hitherto unexpected. "14 The pros- 
pects admittedly opened a gorgeous vista to the policy-makers. The cor- 
respondence and memoranda relating to the proposed charter were voluminous. 
Almost all ministers wrote favorable memos and believed mistakenly that the 
charter would involve no new commitment. 
The Foreign Office timetable was now drawn up. First, the "Niger 
Districts," that is, the hinterland region of the Lower Niger, and the 
Cameroons must be delimited. Second, there was to be notification to foreign 
rivals of the acquisition of a protectorate according to the Berlin Act, and 
third, the granting of the charter. On June 5, 1885, the Niger Districts 
were declared a British protectorate and the limits defined. 
British Protectorate of the Niger Districts comprises 
the territories on the line of coast between the British 
Protectorate of Lagos and the right or western river bank 
of the mouth of the Rio del Rey. It further comprises the 
territories on both banks of the Niger, from its confluence 
with the River Benue at Lokoja to the sea, as well as terri- 
tories on both banks of the river Benue from the confluence 
up to and including Ibi.15 
This special set marked the genesis of exclusive British influence on the 
Niger Districts. Its significance is two-fold: it heralded British exten- 
sion of political influence in the hinterland and also symbolized a technique 
of colonial exploitation--the Divide et Impera policy. Notification of the 
occupation was published in the London Gazette, June 5, 1885. There remained 
14 
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the granting of the charter. 
The drafting of the charter aroused serious controversy. The negotiat- 
ing machinery almost broke down. Goldie demanded a monopoly; the Berlin Act 
had decreed freedom of navigation of the Niger River. So the British govern- 
ment in negotiating with Goldie was undecided on the degree of official control 
he should have. Goldie even threatened that he would sell the Company and 
all its rights to a foreign power. He argued that the restrictions imposed 
by the Berlin Act applied only to the river, and that the British Government 
possessed complete freedom of action in the interior. Nevertheless, the 
charter lay unratified in May when the Gladstone Government fell. It was not 
until Gladstone's return to power that the charter was granted on June 25, 
1886, by Orders in Council. 16 The Company was chartered as the National 
African Company but assumed the name Royal Niger Company on July 13, 1886. 17 
The powers of the Company were extensive and as comprehensive as possible, 
thus making it, in fact, the advance guard of British imperialism. 
18 
The 
Company was given political authority to make treaties with the natives, to 
administer the entire region within its jurisdiction and also to wield 
commercial powers. By the terms of the regulations, the Government had in 
fact bestowed on the Company complete monopoly rights in both trade and 
administration. The Government had stated that "Nothing in this our charter 
shall be deemed to authorize the Company to set up or grant any monopoly of 
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trade." Robinson remarked: 
The granting of political authority meant that government 
was giving back to Goldie with one hand the monopoly it had 
taken away with the other. It was too much to expect that 
once he had been conceded jurisdiction, he would concede 
competition. The company actually needed the monopoly.19 
Within its sphere of authority the Company was to collect customs 
duties from all traders. The regulation stated: 
No vessel, boat, canoe, or other craft entering the waters 
of the Niger Territories from without may touch, load, or dis- 
charge at, from, or into any part of these territories without 
having first cleared at Akassa at the mouth of the River Niger, 
...[or] Lokoja at the confluence of the Rivers Niger and 
Benue....And if any vessel, boat, canoe, or other craft shall 
in any way contravene this Regulation, it shall be liable to 
seizure and forfeiture.2° 
The duties were to be collected ad valorem at Akassa and at Lokoja. Any 
attempt by importers to defraud the Company by having the goods invoiced at a 
lower price than their real value was to be punished by the Company's taking 
over the goods and paying the importer the invoiced prices, plus two per cent 
of such prices. The schedule of charges was drawn by the Government and the 
Company was not allowed to make any changes at all. Added to the overwhelm- 
ing commercial power of the Company was the "Regulation No. XXXVI of 1891." 
On the pretext of suppressing the "intolerable evil"--that is,the slave 
traffic, the power and authority of the Company was increased considerably. 
It was permitted to increase its military force, which was "hitherto ... 
numerically insufficient." Humanitarian sentiment seemed to clothe the 
economic interest--the ever-advancing raids of Fellah slave hunters, which, 
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"if unchecked, entirely [would] destroy the newly-created commerce of those 
fertile regions." 
21 
It can be seen from the foregoing that the chartering of the Royal 
Niger Company in 1886 marked the turn in the tide. British policy in West 
Africa was now to be 
...veiled under the guise of a semi-private enterprise. Public 
opinion was not yet prepared for an open avowal of the forward 
policy of continental expansion in British West Africa, and 
the Chartered Company form of administration was adopted 
until public opinion had changed sufficiently, so that ne 
Imperial Government could take control without protest. 
This was exactly the case. The Company was being used as a trailblazer, 
which was to lay the foundation of eventual British administration in Northern 
Nigeria. Lieutenant Hourst, the French colonial agent aptly delineated the 
Royal Niger Company as the screen behind which England hides herself."23 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 
In 1895 Frederick Engels wrote about development of colonial policy. 
"Colonization," he said, "is simply a department of the Stock Exchange in 
whose interests the European Powers a few years ago divided up Africa." 1 The 
period from the 1880's marked a new phase in the economic transition of West 
Africa. As the slave trade declined, a new trade sprang up to take its 
place. On the Niger and Oil Rivers districts, in the Gold Coast, and in 
Sierra Leone the palm oil and palm kernel oil had received a tremendous 
stimulus. In the Gambia the groundnut oil (peanut oil) was important, too. 
The trade in these vegetable oils was indeed phenomenal; hence the change 
has been described as an "Economic Revolution." Men of entrepreneurial 
ability defied the "miasmic and poisonous mists" of West Africa and so 
"British West Africa [was] dragged into the vortex of the modern interna- 
tional economic mechanism, and thus became a co-operator in the economic 
commonwealth of the world." 
2 
1Cited in R. P. Dutt, The Crisis of Britain and the Empire. New Yorkt 
International Publishers Co., 1953, 51. 
2McPhee, 2. See Ibid., Appendix A for the revenue from the West 
African trade from 1885-1900. 
Date Average value of exports and imports 
1876-80 43,020,000 
1881-85 3,028,000 
1886-90 2,707,000 
1891-95 4,166,000 
1896-1900 6,266,000 
The trade slump after 1885 has already been discussed. 
27 
Sir Harry Johnston, the Vice-Consul on the Oil Rivers Districts, after 
his tour of West Africa and East Africa wrote in the London Times: 
The great tropical continent must be exploited by the white 
races....The time has come--nay, unfortunately the time was, 
some several years ago--when we should as a nation and 
Government definitely decide on our African policy,...with 
the foreseeing view of making every future act and incidgnt 
and opportunity fit in with the scheme we had laid down. 
The economic potentials of the West African territories fascinated him to 
such an extent that he could not but speak out his mind. His suggestion 
that the tropical continent be exploited by the white races was not a mere 
brain wave. Its significance had quite an impact on policy-makers. The 
method to be used, however, was to be like that of the South Sea Company of 
"carrying on an undertaking of great advantages, but nobody to know what it 
is." The driving force of the new era of economic colonization was what 
Dutt called the desire for "super profit," that is, to make a higher rate of 
profit. This, in the Marxian view, could take place on a basis of "pure" 
economic exchange without any element of political domination. Perhaps this 
was what Salisbury meant when, on January 28, 1898, he wrote to the British 
Ambassador in Paris, Edmund Monson, stating that the object of British 
penetration was "not territory, but facility to trade."4 But the technique 
of exploitation was another matter. The close alliance between the Govern- 
ment and chartered companies--particularly the Royal Niger Company- - 
introduced a new colonial policy. The new company's practice was, in fact, 
3 
London Times, "Great Britain's Policy in Africa," Aug. 22, 1888, 8. 
4 
G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the 
Origins of the War 1898-1914. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1927, I, 
139. 
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...to utilize its state machinery to establish political 
dominion or control, direct or indirect, over the backward 
country; including with the use of armed force, in order to 
establish for itself as far as possible a monopoly hold on the 
particular country as a market, a source of raw materials and 
a sphere of investment, and so to insure a special favored 
position for the extraction of maximum super-profit.5 
Without doubt the Industrial Revolution had brought with it complex 
needs. The growing demand for oil and fat led to the new incentive to pene- 
trate the interior of the west coast of Africa. There was, however, another 
motive. The African middlemen had been accepted by European merchants as the 
promoters of West African trade. They brought the products from the interior 
at a comparatively cheap price and sold them to the merchants at the coast at 
a higher price, thus making some reasonable profit. Now as the oil trade 
expanded, the British merchants wanted to eliminate the intermediary position 
of the African traders and so obtain the products directly from the producers 
at a lesser price. Naturally such a practice would inevitably bring conflicts 
for any attempt to go behind the middlemen was strongly and usually success- 
fully opposed. Johnston's account of his experience in the Oil Rivers ex- 
plains why these middlemen were so tenacious in upholding their trade monopoly: 
The Oil Rivers Protectorate ...was at first administered by 
consular authority and by the author of this book, who found 
himself obliged to face a serious difficulty in the determined 
opposition of certain coast chiefs to the carrying on of direct 
trade with the interior. These were the 'middle-men,' who had 
for several centuries prevented the penetration of Africa from 
the west coast by Europeans, in the dread that they would lose 
their lucrative commission on the products of the interior 
which they retailed on the coast. Some of these chiefs were 
of long established ruling families; others again had commenced 
life as slaves and had risen to be wealthy merchant-kings with 
incomes of 430,000 to 450,000 a year, derived from their 
5 
Dutt, 52. 
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profits on the goods from the interior which passed through 
their hands.6 
The effort made to establish direct trade with the people of the 
interior to avoid the exactions of middlemen, was one of the ugly episodes 
of the history of West Africa after 1885. The trade in West Africa suffered 
a slump in 1885 due to the hostility of the natives towards British penetra- 
tion into the hinterlands. As Salmon remarked, the extension of territory 
beyond the coast usually stifled the pre-existing trade with inland people. 
The reason for the decline in trade was not only because of the hostility to 
and fear of the British intruders, but also because of the policy adopted by 
the British. In order to "promote" trade (which really involved displacing 
the time-honored position of the local chiefs), the British administrators, 
"fall, always invariably, into the hands of a local clique of some kind." 
7 
The British were in fact looked upon by people of the interior as enemies 
because the pattern of inland advance did not represent a true intention to 
diminish wars and local feuds. It was, of course, futile to attempt to manage 
Africans except through their selected chiefs. If the administrative agents 
had been genuinely committed to reconciling the disputes of various tribes, 
with a view to extending their influence and trade, the story would have been 
different. What happened was, that as soon as some adjacent tribe or chief 
became more powerful than its or his neighbor, and threatened to assume a 
preponderant influence, the local British administration did its best to stop 
6 
Harry Johnston, The Colonization of Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1899, 115. 
7 
Salmon, "Our West African Settlements," Contemporary Review. 
September, 1885, 48:374. 
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this Power. 
8 
A classic example of such a case was the attempt of the chief 
of Kumasi (Gold Coast) to assume a preponderant influence over the Ashanti 
territory. The British administrators considered such assumption of power 
detrimental to their political and commercial interests. Thus, usually, they 
allied with disgruntled and dissident groups in dislocating the pretensions of 
the local chief. This practice of subjugation of native chiefs, thereby creat- 
ing a power vacuum, gave rise to incessant wars. As the chiefs were eventually 
defeated, the British automatically filled the power vacuum which they had 
helped to create. 
The Royal Niger Company was, of course,using all the authority invested 
in it to make a breakthrough and extend its trade monopoly into the interior. 
It started by negotiating treaties with the natives of the hinterland and by 
1892 it had made over 360 treaties with some native chiefs. These treaties 
were approved by the Foreign Office. 9 The method of getting around these 
treaties was quite notorious because the Royal Niger Company took advantage 
of the ignorance of the people. As Cook remarked, 
...these treaties were often obtained in a questionable 
manner. Native rulers were accustomed to making treaties 
without understanding their importance. In many cases the 
tribal chiefs had no power to dispose of common rights, and 
the legal verbiage of the approved treaty forms could not be 
translated by ill-educated interpreters.10 
Form No. 5 prepared beforehand was frequently used. It stated: 
We, the undersigned Chiefs of , with the 
view to the bettering of the condition of our country and 
8 
Ibid. 
9 Hertslet, I, 156. The Treaties were approved by the Secretary of 
State, Earl of Kimberley, April 23, 1894. 
10 
Cook, 126. 
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people, do this day cede to the Royal Niger Company 
(Chartered and Limited), for ever, the whole of our terri- 
tory extending from .11 
The terms of the treaty were explained to the chiefs by an interpreter 
after which the chiefs "signed" their signature--usually by a finger print. 
It is true that the chiefs signed the treaties. It would be idle to contend, 
however, that the chiefs had voluntarily signed away their rights. Nor did 
such cessions by the local chiefs bestow full powers of ownership to the 
prospector. "No [foreign] government," Cook observed, "really derived its 
powers from the chiefs but became sovereign through the employment of 
superior force." 12 In any case, such a pattern of territorial acquisition 
gave the Company an overwhelming monopolistic power. The monopoly of the 
Company provoked bitterness and complaint from the natives and from foreign 
traders. 13 Other foreign traders justifiably described Goldie as an 
arriviste whose advent and intrusion had challenged the pre-eminence of other 
companies. In due course, the rankling discontent of the native traders, 
whose business had declined because of the Company's monopoly, exploded into 
violent rioting and looting of the Company's stations in 1895.14 
In pursuance of its "active interior policy," the British Government 
chose to identify its interests with those of the Royal Niger Company. In a 
letter to Mr. Egerton, British Secretary of Legation at Paris, Salisbury 
11 
Hertslet, I, 145. See full text in the Appendix. 
12 
Cook, 127. 
13 
London Times, November 25, 1889, 5. Protest by German merchants 
through Herr Von Puttkamer, German Charge d'Affaires in London. 
14 
See Chapter 6 for full treatment of the "Akassa Raid." 
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wrote on August 10, 1890, "In this matter the interests of this country are 
the interests of the Royal Niger Company." 15 Having identified the interests 
of the country with those of the Company, Salisbury could afford to pay the 
Company's deficits by grants-in-aid. 
16 
He quieted his conscience by adopting 
a principle of helping merchants (those in the Royal Niger Company) who 
helped themselves without using much Government funds. In another letter to 
Lord Dufferin, he wrote on March 30, 1892: 
...The spirit and energy of the Royal Niger Company have, 
without expenditure of Imperial funds, or the sacrifice of the 
life of a single British soldier, placed under the protection 
of the Crown, the whole of the Lower, a great portion of the 
Central, Niger, and its affluent, the Benue, up to Yola. The 
Company has concluded treaties with the powerful Sultan of 
Sokoto, and with the Sultan of Gandu, whose power extends over 
vast territories on both sides of the Niger. On the rivers 
an effective administration has been established., and security 
is maintained by patroling steamers and police.lf 
Salisbury and his Conservative Government had been fully committed to 
the "interior policy" on the Lower Niger. In a letter to Sir Clare Ford, 
March 2, 1892, he indicated, "...The English people will never withdraw its 
hand from the steady and vigorous prosecution and the benefit of the ... 
undertaking with which now it is their pride and honor to be connected. "18 
As for the Government the Royal Niger Company had made a great and impressive 
15 
Lady Gwendolen, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, IV, 320. 
16 
British Sessional Papers, 1899, LVIII, 37-48. 
17 
British Sessional Papers, 1892, LVI, 778. 
18 
Lady Gwendolen, IV, 394. 
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success. 
19 For this reason the Government could afford to yield so much 
elsewhere but never on the Niger. The complaints of merchants in the Gambia, 
Sierra Leone, and Gold Coast were unanswered till the time of Joseph Chamber- 
lain who became Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1895. Salisbury was 
content to use diplomacy to improve the relations between his Government and 
those of France, Germany, and Portugal. The French, Salisbury recognized, 
were the greatest danger and enemy of the English in West Africa. They sent 
explorers, traders, and administrators to Timbuctoo, the Upper Niger, the 
Gambia, Sierra Leone, and the Gold Coast. Clashes between English and French 
administrators were frequent. British administrators charged French traders 
and administrators with attacking native chiefs with whom they had concluded 
treaties; French nationals counter-charged by accusing English men of hoisting 
their flag within sight of French cantonments. In a rather lengthy letter 
19 
The Statistics of the Company's revenues are quite impressive. See 
British Sessional Papers, 1901, LXXXVI, 988. Territory Administered by the 
R. N. C.: Statistics, 1887-98 (in L's sterling). One pound equals 4.86 
dollars. 
Finance 
Revenue Expenditure Imports 
Trade 
Years Exports 
1887 42,396 71,324 73,819 223,450 
1888 55,771 73,830 120,878 230,073 
1889 57,652 82,870 139,465 260,846 
1890 62,430 92,258 180,692 286,200 
1891 89,667 107,975 224,729 335,000 
1892 103,155 107,115 181,012 341,800 
1893 110,756 99,255 159,989 405,935 
1894 74,160 104,001 ( 
1895 87,806 108,963 ( 
1896 102,330 117,905 ( "Cannot be stated" 
1897 94,045 135,637 ( 
1898 113,305 135,093 ( 
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Johnston had suggested to Salisbury the importance of consolidating both the 
French and English spheres of influence in West Africa for "a long overdue 
measure of economy." He argued that the absorption of the territories could 
forestall "outside aggression." He went on, 
...these little wedges of foreign territory serve as bases from 
which the French and Germans can penetrate into the interior 
at the back of our colonies, and keep the colonial governments 
perpetually in a state of anxiety by their intrigues with the 
border tribes,...Now if we close up the gaps in the coastline 
between Sierra Leone and the German boundary at Rio del Rey, 
we could just sit down comfortably and develop our coast 
influence. 
Even in his Times article of August 22, 1888, Johnston had chafed at the 
"petty policy" of the House of Commons of refusing to annex territories. 
This, he said, is unfortunate for if it had been done earlier, the "vexatious 
questions perplexing us and obstacles to our progress ...would never have 
existed." 21 In yet another letter he put it to Salisbury that: 
...The foundation of our West African Empire would be a 
splendid stroke of policy, which the nation would not readily 
forget, and which it would associate with the jealous care of 
Imperial interests for which our Lordship's administration has 
always been distinguished.22 
Salisbury was quite aware of these "frontiers open in the rear" of the 
colonies. 23 But he contended that a "pacific policy" would be more expedient 
than forcible enclosure. In his calculation, military intervention, which 
20 Quoted in Roland Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for 
Africa. London: Chatts and Windus, 1958, 135. It was not possible to get 
access to the Johnston Letters. 
21 
Times, Aug. 22, 1888, 8. 
22 Quoted in Oliver, 136; Johnston to Salisbury, October 24, 1888. 
23 
British Sessional Papers, 1892, LVI, 778. 
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the closing of the gaps involved, would be expensive and might not even be 
sanctioned by Parliament. Therefore his doctrine that "diplomacy cometh not 
by observation" was to be put into action. On August 10, 1899, the Anglo- 
French agreement was signed which delimited the boundaries and field of 
influence of both Governments. The Anglo-French territorial rancor seemed 
to be temporarily eased. The agreement did not last long, however, before 
fresh disputes over spheres of influence arose. Resort to open warfare 
which Salisbury ever dreaded was obviated by another diplomatic agreement on 
June 9, 1890. Both Governments agreed to appoint a Joint Commission to look 
into the matter in respect of spheres of influence in the Gambia, Sierra 
Leone, and Gold Coast. In spite of British concessions (given with a view of 
avoiding complications in Egypt), France remained intractable. The Agreement 
of 1890 was a mere makeshift agreement. In 1892, British merchants were 
complaining of French forays into their areas of trade, which depleted 
resources of the British area. In a letter to the Foreign Office the Liver- 
pool Chamber of Commerce complained: 
In West Africa the British Governments of the last decade have 
been outstripped by Germany and Frances the Gambia has dwindled; 
the Cameroons have been lost; two foreign powers have inter- 
vened between Lagos and Gold Coast Colonies--which colonies 
should have been coterminous--the French have opened them- 
selves over Senegambia, and the British Governments have 
yielded the districts of the Northern Rivers of Sierra Leone 
...the Chamber is of the opinion that wherever in the unappro- 
priated territories of Africa a preponderance of British trade 
existed, their British interests should have been secured, by 
proclaiming such territories spheres of British influence.24 
The proddings of merchants and administrators and the territorial 
24 Quoted by Robinson, 382. Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to Foreign 
Office, August 22, 1893. 
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hustle between the English and the French did accentuate British interior 
policy. In the Gold Coast Salisbury thought it appropriate to anticipate the 
French. Treaties were concluded with the chiefs of Dagomba, Gondja, Mossi 
and Gourounsi. These "paper fences" were calculated to bar the French and 
Germans access to the interior. The treaties bound the chiefs to have no 
dealings with other Powers but promised nothing in return. 
25 
Between 1889 
and 1898 West Africa was indeed a troubled arena for gladiators of empire- - 
those of the crowned company and those of the army of the republic. The 
British Government yielded considerable grounds in the Gambia, Sierra Leone, 
and Gold Coast, but never in the Lower Niger. The concessions to the French 
and Germans, as indicated earlier resulted from British determination to have 
all in Egypt. As Salisbury informed the Queen later, "No offer of territorial 
concession in Egypt on our part would be endured by public opinion." 
26 
The 
French and the Germans, Salisbury firmly held, should not be given any place 
in Egypt because "we should insist on the command of all affluents of the 
Nile."27 Salisbury was often willing to hawk the Gambia to France for a 
free hand in Egypt. On the Lower Niger, never. "A great British Niger 
Empire," Johnston said, "will rival India in its wealth of products and its 
teeming, industrious population. 
28 
2 5Robinson contended that the "paper claims, so negative in content, 
so easily yielded, show the feeble imperial interest in the Gold Coast 
hinterland before 1895." 386. 
26 George E. Buckle, ed., Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd Series, II, 290. 
Salisbury to Queen Victoria, Oct. 3, 1898. 
27Lady Gwendolen, IV, 330. 
28 Oliver, 135. Johnston to Salisbury, Sept. 29, 1888. 
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In July, 1892, Salisbury's Ministry fell. Gladstone (Liberal) returned 
to office. His return, however, did not alter the policy. The Anglo-French 
duel over territories in West Africa still continued. The French were making 
ambitious forays into the Niger bend, another conflict flared up over Lake 
Chad--north east of the Royal Niger Company's sphere of influence. For the 
same reasons as those of the Salisbury government, the Gladstone Government 
backed Goldie. By 1893 the French menace was reaching alarming proportions. 
French agents were carrying French influence into Borgu, north-east hinter- 
land of the Niger River. British Government's reaction was vehement. The 
British Foreign Minister, Rosebery, demanded that Mizon, the French colonial 
agent, should be withdrawn. 29 In November, 1893, Rosebery called in the 
Germans in order to stop further French intrusion. The British had never very 
seriously feared the Germans. Their relations had had a personal factor in- 
volved. Herbert Bismarck, the German ambassador in England, was very much 
liked. The Anglo-German alliance led to the treaty of 1893. By this treaty 
the German Cameroons was to extend northward up to Lake Chad and to include 
the western borders of the former Egyptian Sudan. 
30 
This carefully planned 
alliance was designed to prevent the French from reaching the British 
spheres of the Niger and the Upper Nile. If the French threat was not 
eliminated, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the British 
Government to achieve its political objective of direct control of the 
colonies. While the government was indirectly defending the territorial 
29 
Rosebery to Queen Victoria, June 30, 1893, Letters of Queen Victoria, 
3rd Series, II, 268-269. 
30 
Hertslet, III, 914. 
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claims of the Royal Niger Company, it was, in fact, maintaining the security 
of the British future area of political authority. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ERA OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900 
A new era opened in British colonial policy in West Africa when Joseph 
Chamberlain, in Salisbury's Conservative Government, became the Colonial 
Secretary in 1895. He was the first statesman to value the West African 
colonies highly enough to risk war with France in order to preserve them. 
The old informal system of control was totally repugnant to him. He would 
encourage neither further retreat nor conciliation in West Africa. As he 
admitted, he introduced a "new policy" in colonial administration. Chamber- 
lain's "cardinal" and "essential" imperial belief was supremacy, predominancy, 
and paramountcy. 
1 
In introducing his new imperial program, Chamberlain would 
not brook any opposition from recalcitrant native chiefs whom he considered 
as obscurantists. Those who resisted his "forward" policy in the hinterland 
were deposed. Such "crooked expedient" led to serious native revolts. As 
McPhee aptly remarked, West Africa was not an empty land like Australia or 
North America, where one was free to push into the frontier with all impunity. 
British pride in being supreme and lord of lords led to forcible and fraudu- 
lent displacement of native rulers who resisted British hinterland penetra- 
tion. 
, Chamberlain's new policy of "Constructive Imperialism "2 was a monumen- 
tal contribution to British colonial policy in West Africa. He spoke of 
1Sir Charles A. Petrie, The Chamberlain Tradition. New York: Frederick 
A. Stokes Co., 1938, 115. 
McPhee, 19. 
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developing the colonies for posterity. In his speech in the House of Commons 
he said: 
I regard many of our Colonies as being in the condition of 
underdeveloped estates and estates which can never be developed 
without Imperial assistance....Cases have already come to my 
knowledge of Colonies which had been British Colonies perhaps 
for more than a hundred years in which up to the present time 
British rule has done absolutely nothing,...I shall be prepared 
to consider very carefully, myself, and then, if I am satisfied, 
to confidently submit to the House any case which may occur 
in which by the judicious investment of British money those 
estates which belong to the British Crown may be developed for 
the benefit of their own population and for the benefit of the 
greater population which is outside.3 
By 1895, West African trade and revenue were improving, generally. 
4 
The 
increase of trade, as Chamberlain perhaps conceived it, demanded "scientific" 
administration. Chamberlain realized that the forces making for a widening 
of imperial boundaries resided in the frontier. Traders and frontiersmen 
were therefore to carry British influence inland. But as things were, no 
proper roads existed anywhere in West Africa. The only hope of progress lay 
in extending Government function. "It is our business," Chamberlain stated, 
"to extend its functions and to see in what way its operations can be use- 
fully enlarged." 
5 
For Chamberlain, progress and prosperity in Britain 
depended on developing the empire. Replying to the West African Railways 
Deputation he said that the policy of the Government would be to develop the 
resources of such colonies to the fullest extent; and "it is only in such a 
policy of development that I can see any solution of those great social 
3 
Hansard Parliamentary Debate, Aug. 22, 1895, XXXVI, cols. 641-2. 
See Garvin, III, 19. 
4 
McPhee, "Appendix A." 
5 
Boyd, I, 164. 
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problems by which we are surrounded. In other words, capitalistic 
imperialism was the alternative to the corrosive force of Socialism at home. 
To assure the success of this program the Government was to call a halt to 
the laissez faire policy of allowing private companies to do the work of 
Government. In his cabinet memorandum on November 26, 1895, Chamberlain 
wrote, 
...We have entrusted entirely to individual enterprise and capital 
...yet it is certain that in many cases progress has been delayed, 
and in some cases absolutely stayed, because the only methods 
by which improvement could be carried out were beyond the scope 
of private resources.7 
He argued therefore that the state should take the lead in empire-building. 
The developed estates, he contended, would open up "new fields for private 
enterprise and new markets for industry." "Government and Government alone 
can make the roads and the railways."8 
The constructive imperialism of Chamberlain was both a radical and 
progressive policy. Exclusive reliance on local revenues, on diplomacy and 
mere spheres of influence, Chamberlain considered ineffectual for the attain- 
ment of the desired goal. The Imperial Treasury, he said, should provide 
loans for the construction of roads, railways, and harbors, the lack of which 
had repelled the merchant and private investor. 
9 
The British sphere of 
influence, he stated should be brought under effective rule and British agents 
6 Garvin, III, 20; The Times, Aug. 24, 1895, "West African Railway's 
Deputation to the Colonial Office." 
7 
Ibid., 176. 
8 
Ibid., 177. 
9Ibid. 
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were to impose peace and make the Africans contribute their labor and taxes. 
Only by such "scientific" administration, would there be wealth and progress 
for the British urban and agricultural poor. He now fused two items togeth- 
er--development and welfare. As these became the cardinal issue in his 
grammar of policies, he was determined to curb the liquor traffic and the 
slave trade--two evils that crippled trade. If these were not stopped, he 
reasoned, "we should kill the goose that lays the golden eggs--the people we 
want to be our best customers." 
10 
His "new policy" was indeed a comprehensive 
program. Not only the Government but private enterprise, too, was to contri- 
bute to the development of the colonies. In this regard he earnestly appealed 
to the British people "to invest some of their superfluous wealth in the 
development of their great estate"; otherwise, he argued, "it would have been 
better never to have gone there. 
"11 
Towards the end of 1895, therefore, 
Chamberlain authorized the West African administrators to begin the construc- 
tion of railways in the hinterland. British merchants had been demanding such 
construction for decades. 12 Chamberlain's program included possible land 
reforms, collection of taxes from natives to recoup expenses, pacification of 
the interior to encourage uninterrupted trade, official supervision of local 
chiefs, construction of roads and railways to attract native products before 
the French and Germans could divert inland trade to their own ports. 
Calculating on "the opinion of the country which was gradually ripening," 
Chamberlain was almost certain to "meet with a satisfactory response." 
10 
Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, August 22, 1895, XXXVI, 
col. 642. 
11 
Garvin, III, 20. 
1 2British Sessional Papers, 1905, LVI, 361-410. 
43 
Transportation development invariably encouraged British trade. It 
reduced costs of haulage and provided easier means of communication. Facili- 
ty of communication eventually led to the development of big business and 
monopolistic combines which proved injurious to native traders. The impulse 
towards large scale enterprise led to the formation of the West African Ship- 
ping Ring in 1895. Not only was this Ring a gigantic monopolistic combine, 
it brought in its train the system of Deferred Rebates. 13 Such deferred 
rebates were granted to big companies and to the Government. The "petty" 
native trader was crushed, literally. Buttressed in its monopoly, the Ship- 
ping Ring fixed prices with scant respect for native traders. The trade 
previously controlled by natives was now in new hands--British companies. 
The system adopted by the various companies virtually squeezed out the native 
traders from the competitive scene. Their complaints were incessant and 
vocal. But the Imperial Government did practically nothing until 1906 when 
it finally appointed a Royal Commission to investigate the dealings of the 
Shipping Ring. The companies gained predominant access to the natural 
resources of the estates--mining operations, markets, and developmental 
contracts, thus giving them a discriminatory advantage. The British Govern- 
ment, for instance, was the chief consumer of coal and cement from West 
Africa. These were bought more cheaply through the system of Deferred 
Rebates than could have been done otherwise. It is therefore easy to see 
why the Government did not act until late. This ever-increasing "economic 
13 
McPhee, 95. "A deferred rebate is a discount on the invoice price 
returned after a lapse of time to a trader, on certain conditions, as a 
means of maintaining and keeping out would-be competitors from the trade." 
See Encyclopaedia Britanica. London: William Benton, 1964, 19:10. 
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capitalism" accentuated the question of political domination of the country 
where capital was invested. As Dutt put it, "the export of capital [played] 
a special important role in the violent expansion of the colonial system in 
the late nineteenth century and modern imperialist era." 
14 
Chamberlain's program for the development of the colonies was launched in 
1895. The gold resources of Ashanti in the Gold Coast were to be exploited. 
The chief of Ashanti naturally resisted British entry. But Chamberlain, as 
the Colonial Secretary, would brook no opposition. He was determined to defy 
the hostility and opposition of the King of Kumasi who also assumed to be the 
chief of Ashanti. As peaceful penetration seemed out of the question, Chamber- 
lain was ready to employ military force to subdue the king and to bring his 
domain under British rule. On November 11, 1895, Chamberlain informed the 
War Office of the intended expedition to Kumasi .15 The Governor of the Gold 
Coast, Maxwell, was asked to recruit native and Hausa constabulary for the 
expedition. 
16 
Chamberlain informed Maxwell that nothing but complete surren- 
der of the King was to be demanded. When the King learned of the impending 
conquest, his delegates went to London to plead for peace. Chamberlain 
refused their plea. In a letter dated November 19, 1895, to Thomas Sutherst 
who had pleaded that Chamberlain accede to the request of the King's dele- 
gates, Chamberlain said: 
I cannot, when many valuable lives are at stake, stand upon 
formalities and refuse to listen to their intermediary or to 
14 Dutt, 53. Dutt's analysis of the forms and techniques of colonial 
exploitation are instructive. 53-61. 
15 
British Sessional Papers, 1896, LVIII, 835 
16 
Ibid., 847-849. Chamberlain to Maxwell, November 22, 1895. 
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examine into the reality of the submission which they offered 
on behalf of their king....The expedition will proceed;... 
the king will be required to pay the costs which have been, 
or may be incurred in connection with the expedition.17 
The expedition proceeded as Chamberlain ordered. After an orgy of bloodshed 
and destruction the King surrendered and so Chamberlain had his way. The 
money used for the expedition was advanced to the Gold Coast from the 
Colonial Office. 
18 
In Sierra Leone as well, Chamberlain's "interior policy" was applied. 
He authorized the Governor, Cardew, to bring the protectorate under closer 
administration. Chamberlain's "constructive imperialism" met with strong 
rebellion and resistance. Attempts to introduce direct taxation and land 
redistribution were frustrated by mass revolt. The former Governor, Sir 
Brandford Griffith, had notified the Colonial Office that "direct taxation 
was impossible in this Colony." 
19 
Any imposition of taxation as advised by 
Chamberlain for the administration of the colony was vehemently opposed by 
the natives. Salmon, in his article on "Our West African Settlements" (1885) 
pointed out why Sierra Leone always resented British "onerous" taxes. He 
wrote: 
Large tracts of coast have been annexed ...on the whole against 
the will of the people ...consequently, [they] resent our 
presence in their midst,...the British authorities are looked 
on by the natives ...as selfish grabbers of taxes, which are 
all expended within the confines of the Settlements.2° 
17 
Ibid., 848. 
1 8British Sessional Papers, 1904, LVI, 379. 
19 
Ibid., 1893-4, LIX, 344. 
20 
Salmon, 373. The Settlements were the original British possessions 
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As for the land reforms, they were withdrawn as being too explosive. Native 
resistance was so strong that only military coercion could bring the natives 
to submission. Merchants had often requested the development of the colonies 
so as to afford them better profits. But as Chamberlain's program proceeded, 
they chafed at his "high-class" bureaucracy which battered on their profits 
by way of customs duties. As most of his "scientific" administration incited 
native revolt and resistance, Chamberlain exclaimed: "Festina lente is a just 
motto in the development of colonies in the possession of barbarous tribes. "21 
During his first two years in the Colonial Office, Chamberlain accepted 
Prime Minister Salisbury's leadership without too much protest. But from 
1897 to 1898, Chamberlain grew somewhat out of hand. Since 1889 the security 
of Egypt had been a dominant problem in Salisbury's African policy. Conces- 
sions had been made to both the French and the Germans on 
Africa in order to divert their attention from the Nile. But the more Britain 
worsted Fiance in Egypt, the more France raised her claims on the west coast 
of Africa. Salisbury was always cautious not to do anything that would 
result in a war between Britain and France. In a letter to the Queen on June 
14, 1896, he wrote, that the difficulties in Egypt had "enabled our enemies 
to exact what terms they pleased. "22 France had since 1895 been advancing 
towards the Royal Niger Company's sphere of influence. Ilo and Bussa 
(Boussa) were occupied; in Gandu and Sokoto British influence was challenged 
as the French negotiated treaties with the chiefs. In the Niger bend the 
French pressed forward, seizing Nikki and Gomba, where British agents had 
21 
Robinson, 401. 
22 
Buckle, Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd Series, III, 51. 
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already made treaties with the natives. Under these irritating intrusions by 
the French, Salisbury's use of diplomacy was no more welcome to Chamberlain. 
Chamberlain's "sense of crisis--of now or never--henceforward inflamed his 
already vehement temper toward desperate action. "23 As France had proved 
obnoxious and irreconcilable, Chamberlain fumed, she must yield to strength. 
"Peace at any price," Chamberlain said, "is to be an unworthy and ignoble 
doctrine for any great nation to hold." He was determined to resist French 
approaches to the Lower Niger "even at the cost of war." 
24 
Chamberlain's 
belligerence was now open. The crux of his reasoning was that "effective 
occupation" conferred superior rights, or, as the French diplomat Mr. 
Hanotaux put it, "possession is title." As Bussa was a position of both 
marked commercial and strategic importance, Chamberlain was prepared never to 
yield to the French "fanwise" movement of absorbing British spheres. To match 
French military strength Chamberlain created a new military corps known as the 
West African Frontier Force ("Waffs"). The handy "Waffs" would enable his 
Government, he contended, to meet occupation with occupation instead of rely- 
ing on paper guarantees from the native kings and chiefs. The "Waffs" were 
a corps of native militia made up of Hausas and Yorubas, about 2000 strong. 
The new regiment was placed under Colonel Frederick Lugard, who was later to 
be the Governor General of Nigeria (1914). In a letter to Lord Selborne, 
September 29, 1897, Chamberlain wrote: 
We ought--even at the cost of war--to keep the hinterland 
for the Gold Coast, Lagos and the Niger territories. We 
23 
Robinson, 404. 
24 
Garvin, III, 208; Chamberlain to Lord Selborne, Sept. 28, 1897. 
Selborne was the Under-Secretary and Chamberlain's right hand man in the 
Colonial Office. 
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ought not to allow the Gambia and Sierra Leone business to be 
repeated.25 
On December 1, 1897, Chamberlain submitted a stiff protest to Lord 
Salisbury regarding his compromising policy with the French. The letter 
stated, in part: 
I regret that I am unable to agree with the proposal in the 
Foreign Office Memorandum that we should concede to France 
a position on the West bank of the Niger in the neighborhood 
of Jebba, and a right of way across our territory from there 
to the northern territory of Dahomey. I believe that a grant 
to another European nation of an enclave in British territory 
is unprecedented and would lead to the most serious complica- 
tions in the future....I do not think that we ought to yield 
a jot to threats....26 
On the same day (December 1, 1897) Chamberlain wrote to Lord Selborne 
protesting against Salisbury's conciliatory attitude toward the French. The 
letter stated: 
Lord Salisbury's memorandum and his telegram to Monson 
are most discouraging. I thought he was entirely with us and 
now he is prepared to give away everything and get nothing. 
I am more than sorry to differ from him, but I cannot stand 
it.28 
In every way Chamberlain was tough and determined. "If there is war," a 
noted British writer on politics and defence, Mr. Spencer Wilkinson, wrote 
to Chamberlain on March 2, 1898, "you will have to run it. "29 It was just 
25 Garvin, III, 211. 
26 
Ibid., 212-3. 
27Edmund Monson was the British Ambassador in Paris and Salisbury had 
contacted him about allowing the French some access in the Gold Coast 
hinterland. 
28Garvin, III, 213. 
29Ibid., 215. 
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to run the war that Chamberlain desired the aid of Goldie, the Royal Niger 
Company's head. Goldie refused to co-operate unless the future of his 
Chartered Company was guaranteed. But Chamberlain would stand no nonsense 
from Goldie in spite of his redoubtable and inestimable services to the 
Crown. Hence, Chamberlain wrote to Lord Selborne (September 19, 1897): 
Now Goldie seems refractory and practically refuses to move.... 
I should like to tell him that the British Government does 
not understand the contract with the Company as he does, nor 
do they agree that he is to take all the profits and that we 
are to spend hundreds of thousands or possibly millions in 
securing his claims against the French and that he is then 
to step in and enjoy without cost all the security that we 
have secured for him.3° 
Chamberlain's jingoism disturbed Lord Salisbury. In a letter to the 
Queen on November 14, 1897, he said, "Mr. Chamberlain is a little too warlike, 
and hardly sees the other side of the question." 31 But as the majority of 
the Cabinet supported Chamberlain's positive action against the French on the 
west coast of Africa, Salisbury acquiesced "for fear of breaking up the 
Cabinet."32 For the sake of keeping Chamberlain in the Cabinet, Salisbury 
compromised and was therefore "yoked to Chamberlain" on the Niger question. 
Nevertheless, Salisbury did advise that diplomacy and negotiation should take 
precedence over overt military action. By 1898 the Anglo-French rivalry in 
West Africa became critical. Two disquieting telegrams from the Governor of 
Lagos (Nigeria) and the Governor of the Gold Coast were read by Chamberlain 
to the House of Commons (February 8, 1898). The telegrams carried information 
30 
Ibid., 209. 
31 
Buckle, Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd Series, III, 209. "Extracts 
from the Queen's Journal." 
32 
Ibid., 147. 
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about French activities in Bona (Gold Coast) and Ilo (Northwest bend of the 
Niger). Further French encroachments were reported in the Gold Coast hinter- 
land and the "Empire of Sokoto" (under the Royal Niger Company), which had been 
secured to Britain by the Anglo-French treaty of 1890. Chamberlain was pre- 
pared to offer a counter-offensive against French invasion in the Gold Coast 
hinterland and the Niger bend "even at the cost of war." The House of Commons 
was fully in support of Chamberlain's West African Frontier Force ready to be 
used against French aggression. 
33 
Lugard and his second in command, Colonel 
James Willcocks, were authorized to proceed from the Niger westwards to 
Borgu and to occupy towns and villages and so bring such territories under 
British authority. As it was, an open imperial factor had been introduced for 
the expansion of British territorial claims--the use of armed force--instead 
of the traditional system of advance by trade. In the Lagos hinterland- - 
Nikki, as well as the Gold Coast hinterland--Wa and Wagadugu--the British 
flag was hoisted and British officers left in charge of these acquisitions. 
Some times British and French troops confronted each other in the same 
village, each hoisting its Government's flag. The contest was feverish and 
exacerbating. The whole episode was one of "suspended war" which prevailed 
for nine months. 
Lord Salisbury, under the cloud of impending war, was prepared to 
negotiate with the French particularly with regard to the Ilo question. The 
French Foreign Minister, M. Hanotaux had categorically stated that it was 
33 
Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Feb. 24, 1898, 4th Series, Lill, 
1617-1628. 
51 
impossible for him to give up Ilo. 
34 
But Chamberlain conceived of Salis- 
bury's attitude as "a counsel of weakness" and would not yield to the French. 
The exchange of notes between the Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary 
clearly illustrated the differences in the two characters. On June 2, 1898, 
Salisbury wrote to Chamberlain: 
I think we have come to a critical point in the West African 
negotiations and must consider our further course carefully.... 
I say nothing about the quarrel with the French--for that 
is familiar ground. I therefore should confidently counsel 
the abandonment of Ilo....35 
Chamberlain replied to the letter on the same day (June 2, 1898) stating: 
I have very anxiously considered your letter, as I feel that 
a wrong decision may lead to momentous consequences....I 
cannot agree with you that the cession of Ilo would not be a 
climb down....Although, therefore, I am most anxious to meet 
your wishes, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that 
I have gone to the extreme limit to which, as specially 
charged with these interests, I am entitled to go, and that 
on the side of the Niger at any rate, I could not defend any 
further surrender. 
As to Bona [in the Gold Coast hinterland]--...I am 
ready to give way.36 
By this time the Anglo-French Commission appointed in 1896 to examine 
the boundary limits of both Powers was sitting at Paris. Chamberlain 
intimated to the Prime Minister that England would not be the loser even if 
the negotiations broke down. Also he urged that a forward policy of inter- 
ference in the French sphere of influence be adopted. In the latter part 
34 
G. P. Gooch, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, 
I, 155. Monson to Lord Salisbury, June 3, 1898. 
35 Garvin, III, 218. 
36 
Ibid., 219. 
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of the above letter he continued: 
I think that we shall not be the greatest losers even if the 
present negotiations fall through. In that case I hope we may 
take steps to put ourselves in a better position before they 
are resumed. There is no reason why we should not follow the 
example of the French and occupy places in their hinterland 
which would give us something to exchange when they are tired 
of the danger and expense of the present situation.37 
Lord Salisbury could not help but be yoked to Chamberlain. He could hardly 
perceive the value of Ilo but he gave his Colonial Secretary the go-ahead 
sanction in clinching his demand for Ilo. On June 3, 1898, he wrote to 
Chamberlains 
I am wholly unconvinced of the value of Ilo; and I cannot 
discover on what our claim to it rests. But I should prefer 
giving up Bona to giving up Ilo because our title to Bona 
seems to me positively bad. It will be a pity if we break 
off the negotiations, for it will add to our difficulties in 
the Nile Valley.38 
Chamberlain in his letter had suggested that "a small European force, with 
perhaps Indian auxilaries and modern ornaments" be sent to the troubled areas 
in order "to establish our authority." To this Salisbury replied: 
If we are to send British or Indian troops in the hope of fighting 
another Plessey with Lugard as our Clive and Sokoto as our 
Bengal, the prospect becomes very much more serious ...There 
is no loot to get except in Goldie's dreams. If you wish to 
come to terms it would be prudent to do so before we take 
Khartum [in Sudan]. We shall get nothing out of the French 
Assembly after the event.39 
Content with carrying his stipulations on the Niger, Chamberlain wrote to 
Salisbury (June 3, 1898): 
37 
Ibid., 220. 
38 
Ibid. 
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In this difficult business I desire to meet you by giving up 
everything that does not appear to me essential to our honor 
and our interests. Ilo is in my opinion one of the exceptions- - 
Bona is not. If I were alone concerned I would not give up 
either....40 
After the differences between Salisbury and Chamberlain had been 
resolved, Salisbury explained to Paris that Ilo could not be surrendered. 
The Anglo-French negotiation proceeded until June 14, 1898, when the Conven- 
tion was signed. The treaty of "mutual goodwill" involved the delimitation 
of the British Colonies of the Gold Coast, Lagos, and the other British 
possessions to the west of the Niger, and of the French possessions of the 
Ivory Coast, Sudan, and Dahomey, as well as for the delimitation of the 
British and French possessions and the spheres of influence of the two 
countries to the east of the Niger. The treaty was signed by Sir Edmund 
Monson, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of 
Great Britain, and his Excellency, Mr. Gabriel Hanotaux, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the French Republic. The provisions of the treaty were signifi- 
cantly set down in articles I, II, and III. 41 On the whole Britain gained 
the bulk of the territories which had been disputed for two years (1896-1898). 
All the interests of the Colonial Secretary had been gained. The French, 
according to the evacuation terms of the treaty, evacuated their former 
positions along the Niger from Ilo to Bussa, thus leaving the British Govern- 
ment the master on both banks of the River Niger from Ilo to the sea. 
40Ibid., 221. 
41 
Hertslet, II, 786-787; British and Foreign State Papers, 1898-1899, 
LXXXXI, 40-49. For further correspondence respecting delimitation and 
evacuation agreements, see 109-111. 
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Consequently, the organization of Nigeria was "an achievement second to 
nothing in Chamberlain's career ...in the field of Colonial policy." 
42 
42 
Garvin, III, 223. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
BRITISH POLICY IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA 
Nigeria was the largest, and in many ways, the most promising of the 
West African Settlements. 
1 
It was, however, the last of the Settlements to 
be acquired by the British in 1861. Like all the other British former 
colonies, the genesis of British interest in Nigeria dates back to the six- 
teenth century. An English merchant, John Hawkins was said to have visited 
Benin (West Nigeria) in 1553 and exchanged articles of trade with the natives. 
When trade on palm oil, pepper, ivory and other native products took the 
place of the odious traffic in human beings (slaves), Britain emerged as the 
largest European dealer. But as the slave trade eventually declined in the 
nineteenth century, three other factors operated to herald a new era in 
British policy in Nigeria. The first was the phenomenal Economic Revolution 
in the demand for palm oil and palm kernel; second, the movement toward the 
interior for trade, which was not unmixed with political motives; third, 
international rivalry which "completely revolutionized the situation on the 
Coast, a region which had long been a virtual preserve of British interests. 
2 
By 1885, when the period under survey began, Nigeria did not exist 
literally as a unified country. The various tribes that made up the entire 
country were each in conflict with the other. Events and circumstances led 
eventually to the amalgamation of the various sections in 1914 under the 
1 
Evans, 125. 
2 
Ibid., 136. 
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Governorship of Frederick (now Lord) Lugard. To really understand British 
colonial policy in Nigeria (1885-1900), it is essential to examine the 
colonial program in the country. Prior to 1900, British "divide and rule" 
policy was introduced into the country. In Southern Nigeria, consular 
administration was established; Lagos (now the capital) was placed under the 
Colonial Office--the administration being superintended by the Governor; 
and Northern Nigeria was administered by the Royal Niger Company. 3 Repeated 
attempts had been made by the various administrative bodies to extend British 
authority in the hinterland. Such attempts were foiled because of the 
hostility of native chiefs. The policy from 1885-1900, therefore, was to 
remove those chiefs whose presence made British extension of political con- 
trol of the regions impossible. As those chiefs were removed, British 
officials were appointed to replace them as administrative agents. 
The Berlin Conference (1884-1885) was not called to settle specifically 
Nigerian issues, but the decisions affected her in several respects. When 
Britain accepted the invitation to attend the Conference, she made it 
abundantly clear that the rights and privileges acquired by Goldie on the 
Niger were to be respected. 
4 
The principles laid down in the Berlin Act 
(Art. 34), intended to control the acquisition of African territory, became 
of fundamental importance in delimiting the frontiers of Nigeria. The Act 
had provided for "effective occupation" and notification of such occupation 
of which a mere paper claim could not be accepted as valid. A few months 
after the Berlin Conference, the British Government proclaimed the Oil Rivers 
3 
Harris, 135. 
4 
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and Niger Districts as British Protectorates (June 5, 1885). In the same 
year, Harry Johnston, later Vice-Consul of the Oil Rivers Districts, was sent 
out to explore and administer the Oil Rivers. His report was impressive but 
his ruthless actions made a disgraceful record of British colonial adminis- 
tration. The administration of the Oil Rivers was a classic example of how 
British colonial agents deposed local chiefs who resisted British penetration 
inland and thus extended British authority over resistant elements. 
As has been pointed out earlier, coastal chiefs had proved to be very 
valuable agents for British commercial and administrative interests. Many 
of the local coastal chiefs had established themselves as independent and 
wealthy middlemen. Their prestige, wealth and authority depended on their 
capacity to maintain their position as intermediaries between native producers 
and British (or European) merchants. With the increase in the volume of 
trade, coupled with a desire for "super-profits," there arose a suggestion 
that native middlemen be eliminated. The Consul General, Hewett, who was in 
charge of the Protectorate, was so preoccupied with his effort to thwart 
French and German activities that he gave very little attention to this 
pressing problem. It is true, however, that a choice had to be made between 
two policies: either to crush native rulers and establish direct government 
intercourse with the natives or to use the rulers as the practice had been. 
When Johnston arrived in Nigeria in 1885, it was the first alternative 
of bringing the recalcitrant native chiefs to reason that really appealed 
to him. As Arthur Cook described him, "he was a man of strong personality, 
quick to make decisions, and persistent in carrying them into effect." 
5 
5 
Cook, 60. 
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No sooner did Johnston arrive in the Protectorate than he became involved in 
a dispute with a prominent chieftain--King Jaja of Opobo. "This affair," 
Cook accurately observed, "did much to determine British policy in the Niger 
Districts and is an excellent illustration of the processes of imperialism. "6 
King Jaja rose to a position of prominence in Opobo--one of the centers 
of palm oil trade on the Niger Delta. He was once a slave but later became 
a shrewd trader and quickly established himself as a middleman between the 
British and native merchants. His agents traveled widely in the interior 
buying palm oil and palm kernels which he sold to the coastal merchants. 
Many of the merchants as well as British naval officers who visited his 
town regarded him as "intelligent and hospitable. "7 In 1873 Jaja was 
recognized as an independent chieftain. This recognition was the result of a 
treaty which he signed with Consul Charles Livingstone--brother of David 
Livingstone, the intrepid Central African explorer. His position was further 
fortified by a special treaty signed with Consul-General Hewett in 1884, at 
a time when the Consul was trying to forestall the intrusion of the French 
and Germans in the British sphere of influence on the Niger. When King Jaja 
demanded a definition of the term "protectorate" Hewett told him in a letter 
written January 8, 1884: 
...The Queen does not want to take your country, or your markets, 
but at the same time she is anxious that no other nation should 
take them. She undertakes to extend her gracious power and 
protection, which will leave your country still under your 
Government; she has no wish to disturb your rule, although she 
is anxious to see your country get up, as well as the countries 
6 
Ibid. 
7 
Johnston, The Story of My Life, 176. 
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of other tribes with whom her people have been for so long 
trading. 8 
Jaja was therefore recognized as a sovereign ruler of his people. When 
in 1882, a British trader, George Watts, made an effort to trade with the 
people of the interior, thus by-passing Jaja, Jaja protested to the British 
government against what he considered an invasion of his monopoly. The 
Colonial Secretary, Lord Granville, made clear British policy regarding 
inland trade. In a letter to Jaja he stated: 
I have now to inform you that Her Majesty's Government must 
decline to commit themselves to any recognition of your 
claims to this country, and I have at the same time to warn 
you that they cannot permit the taking of any steps which 
would lead to the destruction of the lives and property of 
any British subjects who might see fit to establish themselves 
as traders in that country. 
In practice, however, the policy was not followed by any immediate action. 
Merchants continued to press the Government to assert its authority. 
By 1885 the policy of drifting without any definite action was halted. 
British traders continued to request Her Majesty's Government to protect 
their trade. They were angered by Jaja's trade monopoly and his refusal to 
reduce his prices of palm oil and palm kernel. In an attempt to force Jaja's 
hand the merchants formed the so-called Amalgamated Association against Jaja. 
The object of the Association was to fix the prices at which it would buy 
Jaja's products. But Jaja reacted by detaching one of the firms--Alexander 
Miller and Brothers, from the Association. The Association's efforts were 
8 Quoted in Cook, 61. 
9 British Sessional Papers, 1883, LXXIV, 13. 
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therefore a failure. 
10 
Alexander Miller and Brothers agreed to pay Jaja his 
usual commission if he would grant them a monopoly of his business. The 
Association promptly complained to Johnston. When Johnston tried to bring 
Jaja to terms, he quickly produced the treaties he had signed with Consul 
Charles Livingstone and Consul-General Hewett. But Johnston was determined 
to force the issue. 
In the meantime Johnston had made an extensive tour of the interior 
and speculated that "the extension of trade caused by freedom of intercourse 
between the coast and the rich interior would be enormous" if only the 
truculent King of Opobo River were removed. As he put it, "Jaja represented 
the whole crisis of our Protectorate over Southern Nigeria: our attempt to 
establish freedom of trade." 11 Johnston was determined to make a break- 
through into Jaja's domain. After his tour he reported: 
...Here is the country where white men may hope to settle 
and enjoy good health, and it is from lands like these that 
runaway slaves and upstart Kings like Jaja are trying to keep 
us from penetraing, lest their ill-gotten gains as middlemen 
be diminished.14 
The idea that Jaja monopolized the entire palm oil trade in his domain was 
quite repugnant to Johnston. He was determined to whittle down Jaja's 
obstructiveness. Speaking of Jaja, he remarked: 
He wished to constitute palm oil and palm kernels throughout 
all his domain his own monopoly. He would farm the palm 
forests of the interior, be the sole seller of their oil 
products, and compensate the natives who brought in the oil 
or the kernels. He in fact would do all the trade; and as 
1 
°British Sessional Papers, 1888, LXXIV, 31-32; Johnston, The Story of 
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he had fixed a price at which the European merchants could 
buy these things from him, he resented the fluctuations in 
value of palm oil in the European market....He was seeking to 
become the overlord of the vigorous Ibo people behind his 
swamps. 13 
The King Jaja-Johnston conflict dragged on for some years. Johnston 
on several occasions had attempted to discuss the issue with the King with 
the view of persuading him to lift his "iron curtain" which obstructed 
British penetration into the hinterland. But Jaja declined, stating as 
Johnston put it that, "my 'father,' Consul Hewett, had gone home and that he 
could only resume the discussion when he returned. 
14 
Early in August,1887, 
Johnston made an effort to compel the King to break his alliance with 
Alexander Miller and Brothers. Johnston had persuaded Jaja to sign a 
treaty binding himself, under penalty of heavy fine, not to restrict the 
trade with the markets of the interior. This agreement under duress spelled 
ruin for Jaja. Hence he protested to Lord Salisbury in London. A delegation 
of subordinate chiefs and representatives of the Alexander Miller and Brothers 
company visited London seeking an interview with Lord Salisbury. Salisbury 
refused to grant the delegation a personal interview. The delegation learned 
from an under-secretary that the "matter 'is engaging his Lordship's serious 
attention 
From this time on Jaja's position was at stake. Johnston never 
faltered in his determination to depose King Jaja and thus create a vacuum 
of power in Opobo. He knew he could not depose the King without the sanction 
13 
Johnston, The Story of My Life, 177. 
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of the Foreign Office. So Johnston visited Bonny from where he cabled the 
Foreign Office for authority to deal with his opponent. "To nip [Jajes] 
scheme in two before he could assemble all his widely scattered forces and 
retire with them to the Ibo country," 
16 
Johnston requested permission either 
to persuade Jaja to accompany him to the Gold Coast Colony to be tried by 
the Court of the West African Colonies, or to declare him to be at war with 
the British Government, whereupon action would be taken against him. The 
cablegram demanded a "very quick response!" 
17 
In the course of a few hours 
he received the reply: "Your action with regard to Jaja approved. Further 
instructions will be sent after communication with the Admiralty." 
18 
Johnston 
was now given a free hand to deal with the King. Having obtained the 
authority he wanted, Johnston hastened back to Opobo and summoned the King to 
a conference. The King was given a choice of attending or being deposed as 
an enemy of the Queen. Johnston assured the King of a safe conduct--that 
"if he refused my conditions he should be allowed to return to his town 
before any action of hostility took place. "19 Jaja had little or no choice 
at this time but to comply. He was accompanied by many of his warriors, but 
he later found that he was trapped as Johnston's promise of safe conduct was 
false. 
When Jaja arrived for the conference, he was informed that he was to 
16 
Johnston, The Story of My Life, 180. 
17 
Ibid. 
18 
British Sessional Papers, 1888, LXXIV, 54. See Johnston, The Story of 
My Life, 181. 
19 
Ibid. 
63 
be removed to Accra, the capital of Gold Coast, to be tried by a Government 
appointed judge. "To every one's surprise," Johnston said, "he assented and 
went quickly on board H.M.S. Goshawk."20 In fact, the King's compliance was 
a sullen obedience under duress and not a resigned undertaking. "Surrounded 
by unfriendly tribes and menaced by the guns of the Goshawk he had no choice 
but to yield."21 The King accompanied Johnston to Accra to be tried by Sir 
Walter Hunt-Grubbe. The trial was a farce in that it was a total violation 
of the trial provisions of the Order in Council of March 26, 1885. The Order 
in Council had provided, among other things, the attendance of the necessary 
witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense, the person convicted was 
to be ordered to be of good behavior and only in default of such security 
would he be deported. 
22 
Contrary to these provisions, the King was given 
little time to prepare his case; witnesses were not summoned, and much of the 
evidence preferred against him was false. As a result Jaja was found guilty 
and exiled to the West Indies for five years. Johnston was even content that 
"Grubbe gave Jaja a fair trial. "23 In 1889, when Jaja's health in his West 
Indian exile became critical, Salisbury regretfully commented: "Jaja's 
death would be an extreme embarrassment. It would induce a close inquiry 
into the circumstances of his deportation, which cannot be defended according 
to European notions of good faith." 24 Consequently, he was pardoned by Lord 
2°Ibid. 
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Salisbury and asked to return, but he died before he could reach West Africa. 
The deposition of Jaja marked an important step in the establishment of 
British authority in Southern Nigeria. For one thing it "ended," as Johnston 
put it, "the tyranny of middle- men "25 and opened the way for British penetra- 
tion into the interior. "The quick result of my intervention," the prancing 
proconsul prided himself, "was an enormous increase in Opobo trade, on the 
part of the natives as well as of the European areas." 
26 
"Five British 
firms," Johnston continued, "are now building and trading in the Ibo markets 
of the interior ...and the people received them with the most fervid wel- 
come." 
27 
Johnston had hoped to be appointed the Consul-General or Governor 
of the Oil Rivers districts. To his disillusionment, he was appointed in 
1888 as High Commissioner in Nyasaland. His ambition in West Africa was never 
From 1890 to 1901 he was Commissioner in several of the East African coun- 
tries. "Lord Salisbury," Lady Gwendolen remarked, "was responsible for these 
appointments and had a great confidence in Sir Harry's intuitive capacity for 
the management of natives." 
28 
Instead of Johnston, Sir Claude MacDonald was chosen as the Consul- 
General of the Oil Rivers. (He was later the first Governor of the Niger 
Coast Protectorate.) He made a comprehensive study of the Oil Rivers in 
1889. He visited many of the districts; conferred with many of the chiefs; 
25 
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negotiated treaties with native rulers and had them pledge themselves under 
British protection. In making his report to the Colonial Office he advised 
that the Oil Rivers Districts be separated from the area administered by the 
Royal Niger Company. Liverpool merchants even pressured him to remain firm 
to this decision because of the monopolistic trade practices of the Royal 
Niger Company. The reasons given by MacDonald for the creation of a separate 
administrative unit were three-fold: First, it would prevent the establishment 
of a trade monopoly and make the natives better disposed towards British 
rule. He argued: 
They will all welcome the direct government by Her Majesty's 
officers, because they believe that such rule is absolutely 
impartial in trade matters; but if, in spite of their protests, 
they are handed over to the government of traders, they will, 
so they assure me at Benin, Brass, New Calabar, Bonny, and Old 
Calabar, resist such change by force of arms and with all the 
strength at their disposa1.29 
Second, MacDonald held that relations with foreign powers would be conducted 
more efficiently than if the administration were left with a private company. 
Third, he argued it would be easier to establish direct government than to 
attempt to rule by chartered companies. On January 1, 1891, the Oil Rivers 
was created as a separate administrative unit. MacDonald was given the title 
of both Commissioner and Consul-General, and a force of armed constabulary 
was raised. British rule thus became a reality. 30 
The frontiers of the Oil Rivers Protectorate, as the area was then 
called, were defined. The coastline between the Nun and Forcados Rivers was 
left to the jurisdiction of the Royal Niger Company. The other areas were 
29 Quoted in Cook, 68. 
30 
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left to the management of the Consul-General who was the head of the adminis- 
tration. The creation of the Oil Rivers Protectorate ended the period of 
drift. The Consul-General had in mind a very comprehensive plan for the 
administration of the Protectorate and for its effective occupation. In an 
address to the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce he declared: 
The general plan, which is based on lines laid down by the 
Brussels Act, is to establish fortified posts at certain 
distances in the interior, to form between them lateral 
communications by means of roads well kept and guarded, and 
then advance another parallel, leaving nothing unfinished or 
unguarded behind, and by this means bringing the whole of 
the ground covered under the influence of civilization and 
Christianity.31 
MacDonald's plan was both ambitious and expensive. He established 
Centers of Administration on the more important rivers and in some large 
towns. To meet costs of administration, he introduced import duties on 
alcohol, tobacco, guns and some other articles. The duties yielded a hand- 
some amount during the first year-487,695. 32 The whole Protectorate was 
under the Foreign Office of which the Consul-General was the direct repre- 
sentative. Several districts were created--a fruitful policy of the British 
Government in West Africa--the "Divide and Rule" policy. Each district was 
under the direct authority of a Vice-Consul, who in turn was assisted by some 
other junior officers. The network of bureaucratic machinery was indeed 
impressive as well as expensive for the districts were to finance their 
administration. The Vice-Consul was in fact the backbone of the entire 
system. 
33 
It devolved on him to extend British rule in the district to which 
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he had been assigned, negotiate treaties with native rulers, look after the 
administration of the customs, postal, military, and treasury departments. 
Of all the departments under his authority, the political department was the 
most important. This was so because it dealt with the natives and concerned 
itself with the problem of making British rule an effective instrument in 
restoring peace and order in the district. The extension of British politi- 
cal administration meant, in essence, that, for a real effective administra- 
tion to be attained, some kind of armed force was to be secured. It was 
realized by the officials that they would almost inevitably have to fight 
some of the native chiefs before they could be induced to accept British 
rule. In other words, it would be misleading to give the idea that the 
various districts gladly welcomed British imposition of authority. On the 
contrary, chiefs and tribesmen strongly resented British intrusion. As a 
learned Nigerian statesman put it, "...when people talk of Nigeria today, too 
often they sound as if the Nigerian people had voluntarily surrendered their 
rights and had invited the British to come in. Resistance, however, had 
continued from the very first. 
,34 
A native army was raised under Captain 
(afterwards Sir Ralph) Moor. British administrators and merchants, after 
many years of privation, had finally established themselves in the interior. 
To ensure a profitable trade and the stability of administration, order 
and peace had to be maintained. In the interior, however, inter-tribal wars, 
slavery, and human sacrifices were still rife. One cardinal policy of the 
British administrators was to stop slavery and bring order out of chaos and 
confusion. But the legal stopping of the slave traffic had its political 
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repercusions. The British waged incessant war against native chiefs who 
continued to indulge in slave trade. As those chiefs lost the economic 
benefits from the traffic, their political authority and power came to an 
end. And as the authority of the local chief declined, more conflicts--if 
not anarchy--were generated. It then devolved on the British administrator 
to fill the vacuum of power vacated by the local ruler. This process of 
assuming political power formed one of the never-expressed tactics of the 
British for taking over political control of most of the West African 
colonies. In some other cases, the practice was not as subtle as this. 
Overt forceful conquest was adopted and, in fact, "the practice of deposing 
kings, destroying Nigerian war instruments, and installing weak rulers, [who 
would be mere British stooges] characterized British policy in Nigeria. "35 
In 1893, the Oil Rivers Protectorate was changed to the Niger Coast Protec- 
torate as a prelude to the formation of Southern Nigeria. 
In 1894, the MacDonald administration faced a serious crisis when it 
came into conflict with chief Nana of Jekri. Chief Nana, like King Jaja of 
Opobo, was an able native chief and the Viceroy of the King of Benin. Benin 
was one of the first towns of alluring fame that was visited by the Europeans 
as far back as the fifteenth century. During the nineteenth century when 
attempts were made to find the outlet of the Niger, Benin City was used as 
the starting point of the explorations. Chief Nana had been used as an 
instrument for furthering British interests in the interior. On July 16, 
1884, Jekri was proclaimed a British protectorate. In 1885, Chief Nana was 
recognized as "Governor" by Consul Hewett. But Chief Nana was never popular 
35 
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with the merchants and missionaries. The British merchants accused him of 
obstructing their trade with the hinterland; the missionaries represented 
him as a ruthless slave dealer. To both elements, therefore, Nana was 
nothing but a truculent personage who would not encourage British trade in 
the interior or give up the nefarious slave traffic and human sacrifices. 
Between 1887 and 1888, Sir Harry Johnston went to Benin to investigate the 
charges leveled against Chief Nana by the merchants. Upon investigation he 
"found him different to [sic] the traders' descriptions." Johnston observed 
that Nana's complaints against the British agents of imperialism were sound. 
He remarked: 
he [Nana] was a fine-looking Negro,...I investigated his 
complaints and found them in most cases justified. The trading 
houses came to an agreement with him and it was understood 
that Oe interior markets under Nana's control were open to 
them.) 
The findings of Vice-Consul Johnston did not bring a solution to the 
problem with Chief Nana. The traders had insisted that he be removed as a 
middleman so that they could trade directly with the people of the interior. 
Matters came to a climax in 1894. The Acting Consul-General Moor (MacDonald 
was on leave) acted on the tales of traders and missionaries. Unwilling to 
use Nana as "a valuable adviser in Delta politics" as Johnston had hoped, 
Moor sent a dispatch to the Foreign Office indicating that trade was at a 
standstill in the Benin River, that his authority had been defied, and that 
Nana's continued presence was a threat to the peace and prosperity of the 
Protectorate. 
37 
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particularly the practice of human sacrifices, but the steps taken against 
him were questionable and improper. 
Chief Nana, in order to protect his trade and slave dealing had 
collected some war arms which would strengthen him sufficiently against 
British intrusion. In Evans' phrase, Nana's collection of arms was "the 
largest store of munitions of war ever possessed by any native chief." 
38 
Nana's capital city, Brohemie, was therefore fortified though it did not 
prove a serious obstacle to the British force. Both MacDonald and his 
successor,Moor,were prejudiced against Nana because of the allegations of 
traders and Nana's proclivity for indulging in human sacrifices. The Brit- 
ish first used trade blockade as a peaceful coercion of Nana but it proved 
ineffective. The British Government was not anxious to use overt force 
without some plausible pretext. The pretext for a show-down with Nana 
came over the question of Nana's attack on a small town at the mouth of the 
River Niger. The British administrators felt that British prestige and 
authority must be maintained. Towards the end of August, British and Nana's 
forces met face to face, resulting in several casualties. The British 
brought more pressure to bear on chief Nana by attacking his capital town. 
Nana offered to make peace but the British administrators refused to accept 
anything but unconditional surrender. The town was beseiged; the chief was 
captured after a futile attempt to escape and later exiled. Benin at last 
was brought into British hands. In the place of Nana's administration was 
substituted British rule. Within a few years "trade and prosperity followed 
38 
Evans, 162. 
71 
the flag."39 Nana was left a broken man and his viceroyalty taken from 
him.4 The removal of Chief Nana yielded important results to the British. 
It established the policy of removing native rulers who opposed British 
penetration into the interior; it enhanced the prestige of the new adminis- 
tration and thus prepared the way for a decisive combat with the Oba of 
Benin, the most powerful chief within the Proctectorate. Finally, Nana's 
removal dealt a death blow to the slave trade. 
The overthrow of chief Nana was followed by the conquest of the Kingdom 
of Benin (an important slave center). The King, Oba Overami, was induced to 
give up the slave trade. The anti-slave trade campaign had been, of course, 
one of British pretexts for the inroads into the interior. The King had 
refused on several occasions to place himself and his kingdom under British 
protection. Not until 1892 did the vice-consul of the Benin River, Captain 
Galway, make a treaty with the King, which placed Benin under British protec- 
tion. The treaty bound him to suppress the slave trade, and abolish human 
sacrifices. In spite of the treaty, however, the King still continued in his 
usual practices. In 1896, the Acting Consul-General Phillips, who had 
succeeded Moor decided to visit Oba Overami in the hope of persuading him 
to open up trade routes into the interior and to stop the practice of human 
sacrifice. Captain Alan Boisragon, the Commander of the military forces of 
the Protectorate, remarked, concerning the situation in the Benin City: 
It was becoming a perfect disgrace that in the Protectorate, 
particularly in a part so close to one of our vice-consular 
districts, so terrible a state of affairs as that, in what 
39 
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was not very improperly called, the City of Blood, should 
continue.41 
The King was not happy with the prospect of Phillips' visit and asked him to 
delay his planned journey because he was celebrating the anniversary of his 
father's death. The king did, however, promise to receive the Consul-General 
after some months. To Consul Phillip the Overami's offer was not acceptable; 
he was determined to go. Phillips accordingly notified the King that he was 
coming with a small unarmed escort. This decision was made in the face of 
repeated warnings that the venture was hazardous. In January, 1897, Phillips 
and his party left for Benin. 
The results were disastrous. Phillips' party was attacked and he and 
most of his men, were killed. Only two officers escaped the great massacre 
to inform the Government of the sorry incident. The reaction was prompt and 
immediate. The British agents in the Foreign Office felt that British 
authority had been seriously challenged. A naval expeditionary force under 
the command of Rear Admiral Rawson was dispatched to Benin to punish the 
people. After several days of stiff resistance and orgies of slaughter, the 
British forces entered Benin City on February 18, 1896. The King tried to 
escape but was afterwards captured and exiled to Calabar, where he died in 
1914. British vengeance was also visited on lesser chiefs who had been 
implicated in the attack of Phillips' party. 
42 
The conquest of Benin had 
political, economic, and social results. A territory of approximately 3,000 
square miles was now placed under British administration; direct trade and 
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commerce was opened up between the natives and British merchants, and the 
long-standing practice of slave traffic and human sacrifice came to an end. 
In April, 1899, the Foreign Office transferred the administration of the 
entire Niger Coast Protectorate to the Colonial Office, headed by Joseph 
Chamberlain. The anomaly of two separate jurisdictions in the Niger Coast 
Protectorate was done away with when, in the same year (1890) the charter of 
the Royal Niger Company was revoked and the part of the Niger Coast Protec- 
torate under the Company was included in the newly-created Protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria (January 1, 1900). The titles of "Consul-General" and 
"Consul" were abolished and the office of High Commissioner was created with 
Commissioners under the High Commissioner. The political unit of Southern 
Nigeria was now an accomplished fact. British administration had replaced 
the hitherto native administration. Sir Walter Egerton was appointed High 
Commissioner of Southern Nigeria and the Governor of Lagos in 1904. In 1906 
Lagos was included in Southern Nigeria. 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE MAKING OF NORTHERN NIGERIA 
Northern Nigeria, unlike the South, was the creation of the Royal Niger 
Company and later of Sir Frederick Lugard, its first High Commissioner in 
1900. The discovery of the River Niger was followed by myriads of trading 
concerns which competed with one another for trade on the Niger. The arrival 
of Goldie on the scene in 1877 altered the ever-increasing cut-throat compe- 
tition and rivalry among the various trading firms. In 1879 he succeeded in 
uniting the firms into one organization known as the "United African Company" 
with a capital of 1125,000. 1 Thereafter, the Company's success became rapid. 
Its capital increased considerably and a regular system of trading stations 
was established on the banks of the Niger. The agents of the Company started 
immediately to negotiate trade treaties with the natives, and to maintain 
peace and order in the hinterland for the success of their trade. In 1881. 
the capital of the company rose to £1,000,000 as a result of a subsidy from 
the British Government. In 1882, the firm was recognized by the Government 
as the "National African Company." Prior to 1886 (when the Company was 
granted a charter), the area of operation of the company was almost exclusively 
in the vast region south of Lokoja (at the confluence of the Niger and Benue). 
On July 10, 1886, the company was granted a royal charter and was later 
to be known as the Royal Niger Company. The political and commercial powers 
of the company dated from 1886. The extent of its political and commercial 
1 
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authority has been discussed earlier. Its area of jurisdiction was defined 
to include territories along the Benue to Yola, the Lower Niger and Middle 
Niger, and one thousand miles into the interior as far as Borgu, Gando, and 
Sokoto. 
By the General Act of the Berlin Conference, Southern Nigeria, that is, 
the Niger and Oil Rivers districts, was guaranteed as a British sphere of 
influence; Northern Nigeria was still open. 
2 
France, Germany and England 
challenged one another for the control of the vast area. Goldie, acting 
both for the interest of his company and that of the. British Government, was 
determined to extend his control over the emirates of the north. The German 
threat which developed first was forestalled by the activities of Joseph 
Thomson, the shrewd and diplomatic agent of the Company. By March, 1885, 
Thomson set out on a treaty-making mission with the Sultan of Sokoto. On 
June 1, 1885, Thomson succeeded in negotiating treaties with the Sultan, 
which gave the Company "exclusive rights to the country on both sides of the 
River Benue." The treaty provisions eliminated the Germans as serious 
competitors for the control of Northern Nigeria. The terms of the treaty 
were as follows: 
ARTICLE I - For the mutual advantage of our people, and 
those Europeans trading under the name of the "National 
African Company (Limited)," I, Umuoru, King of the Mussulmans 
of the Soudan, with the consent and advice of my Council, 
grant and transfer to the above people, or other with whom 
they may arrange, my entire rights to the country on both 
sides of the River Benue and rivers flowing into it through- 
out my dominions for such distance from its and their banks 
as they may desire. 
2Cook, 84. 
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ARTICLE II - We further grant to the above-mentioned 
Company the sole right, among foreigners, to trade in our 
territories, and the sole right, also among foreigners, to 
possess or work places from which are extracted articles 
such as lead and antimony. 
ARTICLE III - We further declare that no communication 
will be held with foreigners coming from the rivers except 
through the above-mentioned Company. 
ARTICLE IV - These grants we made for ourselves, our 
heirs, and successors for ever, and declare them to be 
irrevocable. 
ARTICLE V - The Europeans above named, the National 
African Company (Limited), agree to make Umuoru, Sultan of 
Sokoto, a yearly present of goods to the value of 3,000 bags 
of cowries, in return for the above grants.3 
With the treaty in his possession, Thomson set out for Lokoja boasting that 
"not a yard of ground from Timbuctoo to Akassa, or from Orna to Yoruba, had 
been left on which to plant the flag of the Fatherland." Not until the 
Company was granted a royal charter on July 10, 1886, was it really able to 
consolidate its paper claims. 
The provisions of the charter have been discussed in Chapter Two. The 
General Powers of the Company, however, are worthy of further examination. 
The Charter stated: 
The Company is hereby further authorized and empowered, subject 
to the approval of the Secretary of State, to acquire and take 
by purchase, cession, or other lawful means, other rights, 
interests, authorities, or powers of any kind or nature whatever, 
3 
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in, over, or affecting the territories, lands, or properties 
comprised in several treaties aforesaid, or any rights, 
interests, authorities, or powers of any kind or nature whatever 
in, over, or affecting other territories, lands, or property 
in the region aforesaid, and to hold, use, enjoy, and exercise 
the same for the purposes of the Company and on the terms of 
this our Charter.4 
On October 18, 1887, the British Protectorate of the Niger Districts, that is, 
the region assigned to the Royal Niger Company, was defined and notification 
issued thereof. The notification was given in the London Gazette. It stated: 
The British Protectorate of the Niger Districts comprises the 
territories on the line of coast between the British Protectorate 
of Lagos and the right or western river bank of the mouth of 
the Rio del Rey. It further comprises all territories in the 
basin of the Niger and its affluents, which are or may be for 
the time being subject to the government of the National 
African Company Limited (now called the Royal Niger Company), 
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the said 
Company, dated the 10th of July, 1886.5 
Being now authorized by the Charter, Goldie's "energetic and unceasing 
political work" received increased momentum. He and the other agents of the 
Company began a campaign of rapid expansion. Treaties were signed with the 
native chiefs. The major areas of the Company's jurisdiction extended from 
Yola to Adamawa, near the borders of the Cameroons; Borgu in the hinterland 
of Lagos; the emirates of Sokoto and Gandu. Between 1884 and 1892 the Royal 
Niger Company had negotiated an impressive list of treaties.6 The treaties 
were formally approved by the Foreign Office. Thus, the Royal Niger Company 
acquired an overwhelming territory in which it traded and ruled. 
With both commercial and political authority granted to the Company, 
4Ibid., 126. 
5 
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Goldie developed a grandiose policy of operation. The policy included effec- 
tive occupation of the territories. In order to do this it was imperative 
to check the constant slave raiding in the different towns and villages which 
were at war with one another. Finally, Goldie was determined to establish 
diplomatic control over the Emirates of Sokoto and Gandu "backed by sufficient 
military force to hit hard blows, whenever military action became necessary." 
7 
Goldie, in pursuance of his expansion policy, organized a net-work of 
administrative bureaucracy and created a private army known as the Royal 
Niger Constabulary made up of Hausas and Yorubas but with British officers. 
Customs duties and trade licenses were imposed to provide funds for admini- 
stration. Effective political control of its vast area was now an accom- 
plished fact. Courts of justice were also instituted. 
The establishment of full political and commercial authority in the 
region thus acquired was not an easy one. The Company had difficulties from 
three fronts: the Germans, the French, and the natives. By the terms of the 
Company's charter, the British Government had expressly stated that, "nothing 
in this our Charter shall be deemed to authorize the Company to set up or 
grant any monopoly of trade." In other words, trade in the territory was 
supposed to be free, but it was not. In 1887, a German merchant, Hoenigsberg, 
attempted to break the Company's trade monopoly by entering the Niger, and 
then deliberately refusing to obey the Customs rules. Because of this in- 
fringement of the Company's Custom regulations, his cargo of salt was seized. 
At Nupe (Northern Nigeria) he tried to intrigue against the Company, but he 
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was arrested, tried at Asaba (administrative headquarters of the Company), 
found guilty, and ordered to leave the country. The difficulty with the 
Germans arose from the Company's prohibition of German importation of gin 
into the Company's territory. The Anglo-German conflict in Nigeria was 
resolved on November 15, 1893, when both Governments signed an Agreement 
defining their respective boundaries and spheres of influence. The Agreement 
defined the spheres as follows: 
...The boundary, drawn from the point on the right bank 
of the Old Calabar or Cross River, about 9°8' of longitude 
east of Greenwich, marked "Rapids" ...a straight line directed 
toward the center of the present town of Yola. 
From that center....a line shall be drawn from the point 
on the left bank of the River Benue ...crossing the river ... 
direct to the point where the 13th degree of longitude east 
of Greenwich is intersected by the 10th degree of north 
latitude. From that point it shall go direct to a point on 
the southern shore of Lake Chad,... 
The territory to the west of the boundary line traced 
in the present Agreement, and in the preceding above-quoted 
Agreement, shall fall within the British sphere of influence, 
those to the east of the line shall fall within the German 
sphere of interest.8 
The Royal Niger Company had more serious difficulties with the French. 
The French colonial agent, Lieutenant Mizon, had tried unsuccessfully in 1889 
to negotiate treaties with the natives of the Niger delta. His failure was 
due to the fact that the Company placed obstacles in his way and even 
instigated the natives (Patanis) to attack him. The Company, however, denied 
the charges leveled against it by Mizon. 9 In 1894, both France and the Royal 
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Niger Company laid claims to Borgu on the hinterland of the Niger delta. The 
Royal Niger Company based its claim on the treaties which it had signed with 
the chief of Busse. 
10 
The French contended that the chief of Nikki alone had 
the power to sign a treaty for Borgu. Thus there ensued the Anglo-French 
"race to Nikki." Frederick Lugard, the agent of the Royal Niger Company, 
forestalled the French by signing a treaty with the chief of Nikki on 
November 10, 1894; five days later the French mission arrived only to find 
that Borgu had been lost to the Company. From that time Anglo-French rela- 
tions became more seriously strained. It was not until 1898 that the Anglo- 
French contest on the Niger Districts was solved by the 1898 Convention which 
defined each Power's respective spheres on both the west and east of the 
Niger. 
11 
Apart from international complications, the Company faced internal 
crises. The natives and chiefs of the Lower Niger had, for some decades, 
resented British merchants' entry into the interior. The granting of the 
Royal Charter to the Company had intensified existing difficulties. As the 
Company imposed its stringent Customs regulations, Brassmen (one of the 
tribes on the Lower Niger) were excluded from their former markets. They 
made repeated complaints to the Company and the Consuls. But no action was 
taken to lift the onerous regulations. Brassmen had to pay license taxes in 
order to trade in their former markets. The British Government took no 
action to improve the situation because, as Sir John Kirk (a Special Commis- 
sioner sent out later to inquire into the disturbances in Akassa) observed, 
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the Rules and Regulations that Brassmen complained of "were approved by Her 
Majesty's Government." 12 The Company in enforcing the Rules was, in fact, 
implementing the policy of the Government. 
As resentment against the Company increased, Brassmen threatened to 
attack the Company's trade headquarters, Akassa. On January 29, 1895, the 
people of Brass, unable any longer to endure the exclusive policy of the 
Company, attacked Akassa. Most of the property of the Company was destroyed 
and many of the workers were killed, especially the African servants 
(Krumen). After the raid the several tribes joined in the looting that 
followed. It was only the appearance of a steamer, which was mistaken for a 
ship-of-war, that put an end to the raid. 
13 
It was the Royal Niger Company that Brassmen regarded as their oppressor 
not the Government. This was view due to lack 
of true knowledge of the source of the power of the Company. John Kirk stated 
in his report that the Company had acted within its legal rights, even though 
the natives of Brass had been unfortunately treated. A part of the report, 
upholding the grievances and complaints of Brassmen, stated: 
...The Rules in force are practically prohibitory to native 
trade, and the Brassmen are right in saying that this is so. 
They are for all intents and purposes excluded from the Niger 
if they are to respect these Regulations, for how could they 
possibly pay such a heavy license tax and sell at a profit goods 
on which duty had previously been paid to the Protectorate, 
thus placing them at a disadvantage ...to those who introduced 
the same article at Akassa or through Forcados at Ganagana, and 
paid duty to the Company's revenue only? Had the Brassmen 
been originally included in the Niger Territory ...none of the 
12 Quoted in Burns, 152. 
13Ibid., 
154. 
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above onerous Rules would have applied. 
14 
Despite the fact that Brassmen had assured the British Consul that "we 
did not kill the Queen's men at all," meaning that it was the Company that 
they attacked, it was the Queen's Government that wreaked vengeance on Brass- 
men. Regardless of the loyal sentiments expressed by the chiefs of Brass a 
punitive expedition was launched to Brass. In February, 1895, the Consul- 
General arrived in Brass and summoned the chiefs to surrender. He demanded 
from them all their war-canoes and guns, the restoration of all property 
taken from Akassa, and a reasonable fine. 
15 The chiefs assured the Consul- 
General that they were not in any quarrel with the Queen's Government, but 
that they would continue to fight for their rights until the Company restored 
their markets to them. Their reply served as a pretext for attack. A naval 
force was organized and assembled in creek under the command 
Sir Frederick Bedford. An ultimatum was sent to the chiefs that unless they 
complied with the terms offered they would be attacked and punished. No time 
was given to the chiefs to decide on the matter. The blockade advanced with 
armed boats and guns. The Brassmen, mistaking the British flag for the 
Company's flag, fired at the squadron. There were some casualties. 
On the following day a final ultimatum was addressed to the chiefs. 
They were indicted for having fired on the British forces and told that their 
town would be burned unless they submitted immediately. The chiefs were not 
given any time to consider the ultimatum as "any delay would merely give 
time fora further strengthening of the defences." Orders were given for 
14 
Ibid., 152. "Report of Sir John Kirk on the Disturbances at Brass, 
Africa," No. 3, 1896. 
15 
Ibid., 162. 
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immediate advance on the town. Sadly enough, the town was captured and burned 
on February 22, 1895. Some of the towns which took part in the earlier raid 
were also destroyed. Brassmen were now totally disarmed and their resistance 
collapsed. The policy of subduing native resistance still continued. 
Soon after the Brass incident, the Company was involved in a struggle 
with the Emirs of Nupe and Ilorin. This period coincided with the era of 
Chamberlain's policy of aggressive imperialism. One of the powers given to 
the Royal Niger Company was the right to fight the slave trade. The Emirs 
of Nupe and Ilorin raided for slaves in some villages which were under the 
jurisdiction of the Company. Attempts to persuade the Emirs to give up their 
slave traffic proved futile. As slave-raiding was detrimental to peaceful 
trade the Company felt that the Emirs should be suppressed lest their inter- 
est would be jeopardized. Besides, the policy of political control over the 
territories meant that obnoxious native rulers were to be removed and puppet 
heads subservient to British administrators installed in office. In appear- 
ance the "do-nothing kings" were the rulers whereas, in fact, the officials 
were the actual political overlords. 
On January 6, 1897, the Company decided to take action against the 
Emirs. A force of five hundred men of the Royal Niger Constabulary, with 
some British officers and native carriers, marched from Lokoja in pursuit of 
the Emir of Nupe's army which was raiding for slaves. The Company's force 
was commanded by Major Arnold. On January 23, 1897, the Company's forces 
crossed the Niger and advanced towards Bida (within the Nupe Emirate). The 
Emir's forces offered a determined resistance but proved powerless before 
the more disciplined Company force. After four days of heavy fighting 
resulting in several casualties, the town was captured. The Emir fled and 
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another Emir was installed in his place. Soon after the conquest of the 
Emir of Nupe the Company's forces recrossed the Niger and moved down to 
Ilorin. As the forces approached the precincts of Ilorin, hostilities began 
between the Company's forces and those of the Emir Ilorin. They confronted 
each other in a decisive war of conquest. As at Bida the Emir's forces 
surrendered to the Company's army and on February 16, 1897, Ilorin was 
occupied after a futile resistance. The Emir surrendered and had to sign a 
treaty with the Company. One general result of the conquest of both Nupe and 
Ilorin was the recognition of the Company's suzerainty in these areas. Slave- 
raiding was declared abolished and the political authority of the Company, 
after years of resistance, was finally extended to Nupe and Ilorin.16 
The Anglo-French Convention of 1898 gave the British Government the 
"Empire of Sokoto." 
17 
It was realized by the British Government (especially 
Chamberlain) that unless the frontiers were effectively controlled, further 
trouble might be expected. Consequently, the Company started a more 
vigorous campaign of grafting the provinces within the Sultan of Sokoto's 
domain. In the Sultan's Empire, slave raiding was still chronic and local 
rulers tenaciously defied the intrusion of the agents of the British 
Government. By 1899 the British Government adopted a new policy: to take 
direct control of all the areas of Nigeria. Chartered Company administration 
was regarded as a transitional form of government. In declaring the limits 
of the Niger Districts the Government specifically stated that the said 
16 
The best sources for the conquest of the Emirs of Nupe and Ilorin 
are Burn's History of Nigeria, chapter XIII; S. Vandeleur, Campaigning on 
the Upper Nile and Niger. London: Methuen & Co., 1898, passim. Vandeleur 
was one of the commanders. 
7Garvin, III, 223. 
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districts were "for the time being subject to the government of the National 
African Company. "18 In other words, the holding was not intended to be 
permanent. As Lady Lugard said, "it was undesirable that territories, of 
which the defense was provided at public expense, should be administered at 
private discretion." 19 In a letter dated June 15, 1899, the Prime Minister 
notified the Secretary to the Treasury of the Government's intention to 
disinherit the Royal Niger Company. A part of the letter stated: 
The Marquess of Salisbury has for some time past had under 
consideration the question of approaching the Niger Company 
with a view to relieving them of their rights and functions 
of administration on reasonable terms. His Lordship has 
arrived at the opinion that it is desirable on grounds of 
national policy that these rights and functions should be 
taken over by Her Majesty's Government now that the ratifica- 
tions of the Anglo-French Convention of June 14, 1898, have 
been exchanged, and that the frontiers of the two countries 
have been clearly established in the neighborhood of the 
territories administered by the Company. The state of affairs 
...makes it incumbent on Her Majesty's Government to maintain 
an immediate control over the frontier and fiscal policy of 
British Nigeria such as cannot be exercised so long as that 
policy is dictated and executed by a Company.... 
British policy was to acquire and rule the territories but such 
assumption of direct political control was practical only when circumstances 
became auspicious. The Company was used to lay the foundations of future 
British rule in Nigeria. The Company had done a tremendous work in the 
Niger Districts in stopping the slave trade and in restoring order and peace. 
18 
Hertslet, I, 127. The underscored words are mine. 
19 
Flora L. Shaw (Lady Lugard), A Tropical Dependency. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1905, 362. Lady Lugard was the wife of Lord Frederick 
Lugard who was the first High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria and the first 
Governor General of Nigeria in 1914. 
British Sessional Papers, 1899, LXIII, 3. "Royal Niger Company." 
This letter is quoted in full in Burns, 156 and in part in Cook, 111. 
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Speaking to members of his Company, Goldie said: 
Let us never forget that it was the success of our Company in 
this new departure and the emulation aroused by its success- 
ful enterprise, which not only gave security to the Oil Rivers 
and Lagos, but also gave fresh life and energy to the other 
West African 2ossessions which had previously stagnated on 
the seaboard.'1 
Chamberlain was by 1899 bent upon carrying his "scientific" adminis- 
tration into Nigeria and of building up the "underdeveloped estates." He 
had a very strong belief that "Nigeria was a most suitable place to try 
out his theories of colonial development. .22 Being the most accessible 
British colony in Africa, Chamberlain considered that Nigeria should be 
ruled by the Government and not by the Royal Niger Company. In a letter 
to Lord Selborne on September 19, 1897, Chamberlain indicated that "the 
best course will be to expropriate [the Company], lock, stock, and 
barrel." 23 Negotiations about transfer of the powers and rights of the 
Company to the Imperial Government started by late 1899. On December 28, 
1899, the Company's charter was revoked by the Government and on January 
1, 1900, the Imperial Government took over the control of both Southern 
Nigeria and Northern Nigeria. The edict revoking the charter stated: 
The Queen has been pleased, by Letters Patent under the Great 
Seal, dated December 28, 1899, to revoke the Royal Charter 
dated July 10, 1886, granted to the Royal Niger Company 
21 
Cook, 113. Speech of Goldie at the last meeting of the Royal Niger 
Company. "Report of Proceedings, August 23, 1899." 
22 
Ibid., 149. 
23Garvin, III, 210. 
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Chartered and Limited, then the National African Company 
Limited.24 
In the revocation of the Charter of the Royal Niger Company, the Company 
surrendered to the Government all administrative powers, the benefit of all 
Treaties made, the lands, property, mining, and other rights acquired by the 
Company. 
25 
But the Government did not expropriate the Company "lock, stock, 
and barrel" as Chamberlain had threatened. The Company was to be paid a 
Consolidated Fund not exceeding £ 865,000 after it "had given account of sums 
due to it." 
26 
Also the Company was to own certain plants ("factories") and 
trade assets with "certain exceptions." Added to these, the Government 
undertook to pay the Company for a period of ninety-nine years from the 
revocation of the Charter, one-half of the royalties from the minerals mined 
between the Niger and a line drawn from Yola to Zinder (northern tip of 
Northern Nigeria). 
As the Company's flag, "Ars, Pax, Jus" was hauled down, the British 
Union Jack was hoisted in its place. The Company then reverted to its former 
position--an ordinary trading company. It is really difficult to assess with 
any degree of certainty what the Company did for Nigeria. As the former 
Governor of Nigeria, Sir Alan Burns trenchantly remarked, "how far the Royal 
Niger Company's administration was of benefit to the country is a matter of 
opinion. 27 The Company out of a mixture of patriotic and commercial motives 
24 
British and Foreign State Papers, 1898-1899, LXXXX, 124; Hertslet, 
I, 156. 
25 
British and Foreign State Papers, 1898-1899, LXXXX, 1031. 
26 
Ibid., 1032. 
27 
Burns, 158. 
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did its utmost to restrict the slave-traffic, and brought to the people of 
the interior "the benefits of British justice, before any direct form of 
government could be provided." These social "benefits" were introduced at 
the expense of native trade. The native traders within the jurisdiction of 
the Company lost their markets because of the monopolistic nature of the 
Company. Consequently, instead of the "silken love and affection" which 
Gladstone espoused in the relation of annexed colonies and the supreme 
government, persistent hatred and irritation were aroused by the Company. 
The Akassa incident was a case in point. As for contributing to the pros- 
perity of the dependency, the Company helped in no small measure by its 
pioneering enterprise but mainly for its own benefit alone. As the monopo- 
listic Regulations of the Company were stringently enforced, the probability 
of mutual benefit of the countries' resources (that is, between the Company 
and the natives) was ruled out. The Company fixed its own prices for the 
products from the interior especially palm oil and palm kernels. Hence the 
native producers scarcely traded at a reasonable profit. On the revocation 
of its charter the Company was changed to the Niger Company, Limited. In 
1920 the control of the Company was assumed by Lever Brothers, Limited. Now, 
the Company has been absorbed into the United Africa Company (U.A.C.), which 
operates throughout West Africa. 28 
As soon as the Company's Charter was revoked, Chamberlain launched his 
"scientific" administration. In the Niger Coast Protectorate and Lagos 
(united in 1906) a net-work of roads, railways, and harbors were started to 
facilitate trade and administration of the interior. Perhaps Chamberlain was 
28 
Ibid. 
89 
aware of the charges of the French regarding the underdeveloped nature of 
British colonies in West Africa. Lieutenant Hourst indicted British colonial 
policy when he wrote: 
...There are no means of communication between one place and 
another....We have done better than the English on the Upper 
Niger; our colonization is far superior to theirs. On the 
Lower Niger they have neither telegraph wires, for these go no 
further than Akassa and Brass, at the mouth of the river, no 
road at all to be compared with our line of revictualling posts, 
and of course, need we add? they have no railway:H29 
The railways constructed under Chamberlain's regime led to the extension of 
political control in the hinterland of Lagos. By the treaties of 1899 
Ibadan, Oyo, Ilesha, and Abeokuta were included in the British Protectorate 
of Southern Nigeria. 30 In Lagos, too, trade received a tremendous impulse. 
IMPORTS EXPORTS (in J:000)31 
1895 816,000 985,000 
1895 (rubber) 270,000 
1896 (rubber) 348,000 
The territory expropriated from the Royal Niger Company was entrusted to Sir 
Frederick Lugard who was the first High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria in 
1900. The Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, therefore, came into being; 
that is, what was the vast hinterland of the Company. The Niger Company's 
territory was included in the Niger Coast Protectorate (changed to Southern 
Nigeria). The administration of Northern Nigeria by Lugard goes beyond the 
period under review. But it is helpful to know that it was Lugard who 
29 
Lieutenant Hourst, 488. 
30 
The treaties were abrogated in 1914 after the amalgamation of Northern 
and Southern Nigeria. 
31 
Pim, 60. Rubber was a new commodity which almost became a rival to 
the palm oil trade. Under British encouragement the export increased 
considerably. 
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introduced in 1914 indirect Rule (administration by native rulers under the 
guidance of British officials) into Northern Nigeria and who was also 
responsible for the unification of the North and the South in 1914. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE GOLD COAST 
The Gold Coast, like the other West African countries, felt the impact 
of the West by way of commercial contact. The Portuguese were the first 
European people to come to the Gold Coast. The name "Gold Coast" was applied 
to the area by the Portuguese because of the abundance of gold. In 1471 the 
Portuguese established trade in gold at Elmina and in 1482 they built a fort 
there for the purpose of trade. In a short time, however, Portuguese monop- 
oly was invaded and the Gold Coast soon became the arena of international 
rivalry. 
The first British post on the Gold Coast was established at Koramantin 
in 1631. In due course more British forts were built at the coast such as 
Accra, Winneba, Anamabo, Komenda, Sekondi, Dixcove, and others. By the 
1800's the British had in fact established a strong foothold on the coast. 
Until 1821 the administration of the coastal territories was undertaken by 
a trading company--the African Company of Merchants. As was the case of the 
Royal Niger Company in Nigeria, the African Company of Merchants, formed for 
commercial purposes, became simultaneously a political administrator under 
Government subsidy. The Government granted the Company an annual subsidy 
of44:13,000. 
1 
Company rule was abrogated in 1821 and the British Government assumed 
direct control of the coastal possessions. Sir Charles McCarthy became the 
1 David E. Apter, Ghana in Transition. New York: Aheneum Co., 1903, 31. 
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first Governor, with Sierra Leone as his headquarters. From the appointment 
of McCarthy until 1900 nothing but civil strife raged in the Gold Coast. An 
examination of the records of the activities of the British administrators in 
West Africa would show that the officials were a mixed lot. "Some of them ... 
were zealous and clear-headed imperialists religiously dedicated to the 
service of Great Britain in West Africa; others ...were drawn from the 
barbarians of the Western world." 
2 
As for McCarthy and his followers, they 
were aggressive imperialists. All they aspired for was to push the political 
frontier of their Home Government. To do this they had to break the power of 
the Ashanti King whose power extended to many of the neighboring tribes in 
the interior. 
For centuries the British had tried to penetrate into the interior of 
the Gold Coast. The King of Ashanti had equally resisted all British move- 
ments into the hinterland. For several years there existed internecine war 
between the British and the Ashantis who tried to preserve their virgin land. 
The final debacle came in 1873. In 1872 the Dutch ceded fort Elmina to the 
English. This angered the Ashantis who feared the British becoming the sole 
authority over the Guinea Coast. A new war broke out. This time the British 
determined to settle the question once and for all. Troops were brought from 
England, commanded by Sir Garnet Wolseley. Kumasi, the Ashanti capital, was 
beseiged. Wolseley charged with relentless brutality until the King of 
Ashanti, Kofi Karikari, surrendered. As the power of the King made a British 
protectorate of the Gold Coast almost impossible, a deal with him was inevi- 
table. On the 13th and 14th of February, 1874, a Treaty of Peace was 
2K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885. Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1956, 127. 
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concluded between the Government and King Karikari at Fomana. 
3 
This treaty 
was a landmark in the history of British penetration into the Gold Coast 
hinterland. By Article III of the Treaty, the Ashanti chief was induced to 
renounce all rights to or homage from the neighboring tribes which were 
formerly subjects of the Kingdom of Ashanti. By Article IV of the same 
Treaty, the King also renounced for ever all pretentious to the supremacy 
over Elmina, or over any other areas and tribes connected with the Dutch. 
In addition, the King was enjoined to abolish human sacrifices and to pay a 
large indemnity to the British Government (50,000 ounces of gold). As a 
natural consequence of the defeat, the power of the Ashanti confederacy was 
seriously undermined, and the preponderant power of the King was considerably 
diminished. 
The Ashanti War marked a definite step in the extension of British 
authority in the Gold Coast. Having subdued the Ashanti Kingdom the British 
Government decided to assume full control over the coastal areas by annexing 
them as the Gold Coast Colony. 
4 
This policy of annexation had two important 
consequences. In the first place, the annexation of the coastal regions was 
a unilateral action by the British riding roughshod over the local aspirations 
of the Fantis. The Fantis were the allies of the British against the Ashanti 
King. In 1844 an agreement was signed between the British and the chief of 
Fanti. By this "Bond," as it is popularly called, the Fantis acknowledged 
the "power and jurisdiction" of the British Government. In other words, the 
3 
See Hertslet, I, 65-67 for extracts of the peace. The terms of the 
King's petition to the British Government are treated in Henry Brackenbury, 
The Ashanti War. London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1874, II, 318-319. 
4 
British and Foreign State Papers, 1882-1883, LXXIV, 605-616. 
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British Government was to act as protector and defender of Fanti from the 
iron hand of the King of Ashanti. This trusteeship, the Fantis believed, was 
to be relinquished in the future as they had no understanding of the Fanti 
tribe losing its independence. As the aspirations of the Fanti Confederacy 
(formed in 1871) became frustrated by the annexation act, its relation with 
the British Government thereafter was strained. Secondly, the annexation 
of the coastal tribes was a prelude to the aggressive hinterland penetration 
from 1885. 
The "Scramble" for West Africa extended to the Gold Coast. Frequent 
bickerings ensued among European Powers for spheres of influence in that 
area. In July, 1884, the Germans under the leadership of Dr. Nachtigal 
declared a Protectorate over Togoland (eastern border of the Gold Coast); the 
French also were entrenched in Ivory Coast (the western border). Both France 
and Germany were frantically campaigning for access into the hinterland of 
the Gold Coast. The presence of the French and the Germans seemed to 
constitute a threat to British interests in the Gold Coast and to bring a 
change in the Government's colonial policy. "If British authority were not 
extended over Ashanti [that is the interior]," the Government policy-makers 
thought, "our French and German rivals would soon step in in our stead and 
cut off the Gold Coast from its natural hinterland." 5 The long age of easy 
supremacy on the Gold Coast was now gone forever. Trade, which had actuated 
Britain's first entry into the Gold Coast, now gave way to the quest for 
political control over the Colony as well as the hinterland. The extension 
of British authority into Ashanti and the Northern Territories formed the 
5 
Evans, 108. 
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major story of the Gold Coast from 1885 to 1900. As Lord Wolseley, the 
British army commander during the Ashanti war (1874) pithily remarked, 
any attempt to relate the history of our early relations 
with Ashantee [Ashanti] ...would certainly redound neither 
to the credit of our arms nor to the intelligence of our 
Ministers. 6 
The Berlin Act of 1885 had set the scheme for "the rape of Africa." At 
the Conference of Berlin British interests in the Gold Coast were recognized. 
To consolidate these interests, effective occupation, as provided by the 
Berlin Act, was inevitable. British agents were sent out to the Gold Coast 
to make treaties with native chiefs. Various states were placed under British 
protection.? On January 13, 1886, Letters Patent were issued making the Gold 
Coast Settlements a colony separate from the joint Government of the Gold 
Coast and Lagos. 
8 
On July 14, 1886, British and German spheres of influence 
in the Gold Coast Colony and Togo Protectorate, respectively, were defined. 
The Anglo-German Agreement of 1886 was reinforced by the British and German 
Commissioners' Joint Recommendations in December, 1887. 
9 
The stage was then set for the pursuance of British policy in the 
interior of the Gold Coast. Ashanti was the target. Petitions had been 
sent to the Secretary of State, Lord Knutsford, by merchants asking that 
British authority be extended into Ashanti. The merchants complained that 
the Ashantis prevented "all intercourse but their own with the waterside 
6 Quoted from Claridge, I, 529. 
7 
See Hertslet, I, 69-72. 
8 
Ibid., I, 69. 
9 Ibid., I, 890. 
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nations." It was observed that it was still "not the custom" for traders to 
visit the Ashantis. 
10 
To use the terminology of James S. Coleman, the 
Ashanti's "early resistance movement "11 was directed against British-spon- 
sored forces. Yet it was not mere hostility that motivated the Ashanti 
resentment of British penetration; the objective was explicitly to maintain 
"the self-government and independence of [the Gold Coast] as a nation-state 
existing on the basis of equality in an international state system." 
12 
In spite of all protests and resistance against British penetration, the 
British Government was determined to penetrate the Ashanti Kingdom by a leap- 
frog process. The policy at first was access through moral influence. In 
1887 two British officials, Captain R. La T. Lonsdale and E. A. Barnett were 
sent to Ashanti on a peace-making mission. 
13 
It was in the presence of the 
British representative, Barnett, that a new king of Ashanti, Prempeh, was 
elected with the title of Kwaku Dua III. He was given the care of the "Royal 
Stool" (the symbol of power and authority in Ashanti) and referred to there- 
after as King of Kumasi. 
14 
No matter what half-hearted measures were adopted 
by the British, their primary objective was to include Ashanti in the 
Protectorate. 
10 
British Sessional Papers, 1865, V. Report from the Select Committee 
on Africa 5;;tern Coast), reply to question 3,268. 
11 James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1958, 170. 
12 
Ibid., 169. 
13 
Kimble, 278. 
14 
Ibid.; Barnett to Brandford Griffith, March 29, and May 9, 1888, 
Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of the Gold Coast, London, 
1888, C5615. 
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The Colonial Office was then anxiously watching the restoration of peace 
in Ashanti. Barnett added to the chorus urging the Government to appoint a 
British Resident there. While local British administrators in the Gold Coast 
Colony were in haste to extend British authority into the hinterland, the 
Colonial Office was prepared to pursue the policy slowly. The Governor, 
Brandford Griffith, had advised that the Ashanti territory should be brought 
under British jurisdiction to forestall French colonial ambitions in the Gold 
Coast hinterland. 15 By 1888, of course, the French were once more carrying 
out exploration schemes in the Gold Coast hinterland. The Governor also 
warned against German encroachments. To this, Sidney Web, a young official 
in the Colonial Office replied: 
I should pause before going further north. It would no doubt 
be inconvenient to have the Germans behind our back at the 
Gold Coast, but ...the Gold Coast Colony has cost England 
some six lives this year alone. Is it worth extending? 16 
German ambition in Ashanti posed no serious threat to the Colonial Office. 
The Secretary of State, Lord Knutsford (then Holland) wrote: "If Ashanti is 
to be annexed to any European power let it be by the Germans." 17 Such 
apparent indifference was characteristic of British action in West Africa. 
The British never took any serious action on the west coast of Africa without 
inventing some explanation for it--an outside force or factor necessitating 
its intervention. In any case, the diplomatic haggling in Europe, combined 
15 
C0/96/173. Confidential Despatch of April 22, 1886, from Brandford 
Griffith to Granville. This and other C.O. information was obtained by 
correspondence. 
16 
CO/96/88. Minute of August 22, 1887, by Sidney Web. 
17 
C0/96/188. Minute of September 21, 1887, by H. T. Holland. 
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with the competitive penetration in the interior, made the British Govern- 
ment adopt a strong forward interior policy. On August 10, 1889 the Anglo- 
French Agreement was signed. By Article III of this treaty Great Britain was 
given a free hand in Ashanti.18 Anglo-German frontiers were also defined on 
July 1, 1890. The British Government was therefore given full liberty of 
political action in the Ashanti Kingdom to the north of the Gold Coast 
Colony. 
The period of apparent friendliness between the Ashantis and the British 
(1874-1888) came to an end with the enstoolment of King Prempeh. Prempeh was 
a strong man who refused to be subservient to the British and claimed to 
remain independent as of old. His predecessor had signed a treaty to keep 
the road from Kumasi to the River Prah open for British trade, and to prevent 
human sacrifices. His authority over neighboring tribes had also been 
checked by the treaty. King Prempeh was ambitious to restore the prestige of 
Ashanti by bringing the various peoples who had been under Ashanti rule back 
to their earlier allegiance. Such moves by King Prempeh were intolerable to 
the British administrators who did not want to see a strong and united 
Ashanti. 19 King Prempeh refused the request that a British Resident be sent 
to Ashanti. Several futile efforts were made to persuade King Prempeh to 
accept British protection over Ashanti. In a letter to the Governor on May 
7, 1891, King Prempeh wrote: 
18 Hertslet, I, 77-79. 
19 C0/96/151. Minute of October 6, 1883, by R. H. Meade; "We don't want 
a strong united Ashanti." Meade was the Permanent Under-Secretary in the 
Colonial Office. 
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I am happy to say we have arrived at this conclusion, that 
my Kingdom of Ashanti ...must remain independent as of old, 
at the same time to be friendly with all white men....Believe 
me, Governor, that I am happy to inform you, that the cause of 
Ashanti is progressing.' 
King Prempeh was to enjoy his "independence as of old" for only five years 
before the Kingdom disintegrated; and the Governor watched patiently to 
"gather the fruit when it is ripe." The British continued their policy of 
expansion by signing treaties of "friendship and freedom of trade" with 
dissident chiefs of the north, who wished to assert their independence of 
Ashanti. By 1893 events were building up to a climax. In that year King 
Prempeh attempted to attack a neighboring tribe, Attabubu, which was under 
British protection. A strong warning was issued to King Prempeh by the 
Acting Governor, F. M. Hodgson. A force of Hausas under a British commander, 
Sir Francis Scott, was dispatched to Kumasi. Both Hodgson and Scott urged 
that Ashanti be annexed without further delay. Their views were sympatheti- 
cally received at the Colonial Office. One of the Secretary's minutes 
recorded in the Colonial Office stated: 
As regards Ashanti the present moment seems more favorable 
than we may see again. The King is cowed and the bulk of the 
people wish for protection, so the time is ripe for a bold 
stroke such as tells with savages. The Colony is rich and 
can afford the outlay (say 10,000) which will be necessary 
for a few years.21 
Lord Ripon, then the Secretary of State in Gladstone's Liberal Cabinet, 
postponed the inevitable. He refused to support the "forward policy" of the 
Governor. Repudiating Hodgson's drastic action he wrote: "I do not desire to 
Quoted from Kimble, 281, King Prempeh to Brandford Griffith, May 7, 
1891. 
21 C0/96/238, Minute of December 21, 1893, by J. Branston. 
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annex Ashanti in name or in fact and thereby greatly to increase the 
responsibilities of the Gold Coast Government." 
22 
The refusal to annex 
Ashanti outright was based on the economic factor, which was the general 
argument of Gladstone's Government against annexation. The Secretary of 
State, however, suggested that the Governor seek a via media, by making 
treaties of friendship with the King instead of using force. The King was 
to be persuaded to accept a British Resident in Kumasi "as the Agent of this 
Government, and as your friend and advisor. 
u23 
The Governor then wrote to 
King Prempeh to this effect. The reply to his letter was delayed because King 
Prempeh was observing the funeral celebration of his sister and also because 
he was being placed on the "Golden Stool." 
24 
In June, King Prempeh finally 
sent a reply to Governor Griffith through his courtiers. The Governor 
stated, "was not such as to make them worthy of having an interview with 
me. 
u25 
In the mean time, exaggerated reports of the enstoolment ceremony were 
sent to the British administrators at the Coast. Atrocious stories of human 
sacrifice and "dreadful slaughter of human victims" were circulated around as 
being connected with King Prempeh's enstoolment. The Governor refused to 
recognize the enstoolment, alleging that it was a sham ceremony, performed by 
22 C0/96/238, Minute of January 15, 1894, by Ripon. 
23 C0/96/243, Hodgson to Ripon, February 26, 1894. 
24 
The "Golden Stool" was the outward sign of sovereignty and the object 
of greatest reverence among the Ashantis. As they said of it, it was their 
"spirit." 
25 C0/96/247, Bradford Griffith to Ripon, June 28, 1894. 
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selected puppets. 26 In September, 1894, the Governor strongly recommended 
that a strong mission should be sent to Kumasi if the King still delayed in 
replying to the British proposals. 
27 
Once again the Secretary of State 
reiterated: "it is not the policy of H.M's Govt. to annex Ashantee, and that 
it should be very unacceptable to us to advance in that direction." 28 It 
seemed the Governor was acting on the prejudices of merchants and mission- 
aries, who protested against the restriction of trade in Ashanti, and the 
"revolting, cruel and savage iniquities" reported by missionaries. In any 
case, no strong action was taken by the Liberal Government until 1895. 
King Prempeh temporized before giving a reply to Governor Brandford 
Griffith. He consulted other Ashanti chiefs and they reached a decision to 
send a delegation to the Queen in England in protest against the invasion of 
the independence of Ashanti. Hearing of the proposed delegation, the Gover- 
nor did all he could to discredit King Prempeh and his envoys. On January 
25, 1895, the Governor wrote to Ripon (the Secretary of State) with all 
blatant cynicism: 
As the Ethiopian cannot change his skin, so also the Ashanti 
cannot change the natural bent of his mind in the direction 
of deceit, hypocrisy, mendacity, treachery, and unreliable- 
ness.29 
The irate Governor urged the Secretary of State to deal a crushing blow to 
26 
For the Chieftaincy controversy see British Sessional Papers, 1896, 
LVIII, 801. 
27C0/96/247, Brandford Griffith to Ripon, Sept. 28, 1894. 
28C0/96/248, Conversation between Ripon and Hodgson, Oct. 23, 1894. 
29 
C0/96/254, Confidential Dispatch of January 25, 1895, Brandford 
Griffith to Ripon. 
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Ashanti which would bring it under control. 
30 
The defiance of "this petty 
King" did, eventually, cause some exasperation in the Colonial Office, but 
the use of military force was not sanctioned. The matter was referred to 
Sir William Maxwell who soon replaced Griffith as Governor. His instruction 
was to secure a peaceful settlement. In any case, the King's delegation in 
London was not received by either the Secretary of State or the Queen. The 
Ashanti were informed that they could not be received. 
Events had been moving rapidly to a crisis. In September, 1895, the 
Liberal Government was replaced by Salisbury's Conservative Cabinet. With 
the coming of a new Government, there was to be a new policy. Joseph Chamber- 
lain was appointed as the new Colonial Secretary and Maxwell as the Governor 
of the Gold Coast. No sooner was Chamberlain in Office than he entered into 
a deadly conflict with King Prempeh. In the Gold Coast Maxwell formulated his 
new policy which synchronized with Chamberlain's strong interior policy in 
West Africa. The Governor was to meet the King in person and persuade him 
to accept British protection in Ashanti, guarantee freedom of trade between 
the coast and the interior, and abolish human sacrifices. If the King 
refused, then an ultimatum threatening military action would be sent to 
him. According to Maxwell, all the other Ashanti chiefs were to "hold aloof 
or take the consequences." 
At this time, too, British merchants were urging the British Government 
to establish British administration in Ashanti. The London Chamber of 
Commerce (African Trade Section) wrote to the Colonial Secretary alleging 
that commerce had been impeded in Ashanti. The letter stated, in part: 
30 
Ibid., Telegram from Brandford Griffith to Ripon, Feb. 12, 1895. 
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I ...call your attention to the continued unsettled state 
of the country and the hinderances to trade caused thereby, 
and to urge upon Her Majesty's Government the great 
desirability of taking immediate steps for the establish- 
ment of a system of administration in Ashanti, or for the 
appointment of a British resident in that country.31 
The reply from the Colonial Office, dated August 22, 1895, stated that the 
question of the policy to be adopted regarding Ashanti "is still engaging 
[the Colonial Secretary's] attention. ,32 The letter pointed out, however, 
that Ashanti "is not in a disturbed state." On September 25, 1895, the 
Liverpool Merchants wrote to the Colonial Office in support of the London 
Chamber of Commerce. 
Governor Maxwell had made his "forward policy" clear to Chamberlain. In 
a cablegram sent to the Governor in September, 1895, the Colonial Secretary 
sanctioned Maxwell's proposals, adding, unfortunately, that King Prempeh 
should pay the remaining indemnity imposed in 1874 or face a military expedi- 
tion. Unable to appreciate that the old British hesitation had been 
abandoned, and that a new forward policy had been devised, King Prempeh 
delayed once again in giving a reply to the demands. As to the payment of 
the overdue indemnity, King Prempeh stressed that he had no resources to pay 
the 50,000 ounces of gold 33 required by the Colonial Office. Indeed, "it 
was not obduracy that solely governed [King Prempeh's] action; it was the 
awareness of the poverty of his Kingdom." 34 
31 British Sessional Papers, 1896, LVIII, 810. London Chamber of Commerce 
to the Colonial Office, August 3, 1895. 
32 
Ibid., 813. 
33 
F. M. Bourret, The Gold Coast. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 1949, 24. 
34 
Ibid. 
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As in the previous year, King Prempeh hesitated in accepting the terms 
imposed. Chamberlain, however, was a man of his word. An ultimatum was sent 
to the King: either to accept the proffered treaty or face military interven- 
tion. At this juncture, King Prempeh decided to plead for peace. He sent an 
envoy to London to meet the Colonial Secretary. Chamberlain was adamant. 
Pleas from Members of Parliament to accede to the request of the King's 
delegates had no effect on him. Writing to the Permanent Under-Secretary 
(Sir Robert Meade) on October 10, 1895, he said: 
The attempt to excite English sympathy for the King of 
Ashanti is a fraud on the British public. He is a barbarous 
chief, who has broken the Treaty, permitted human sacrifices, 
attacked friendly chiefs, obstructed trade, and failed to pay 
the fine inflicted on him after the war; [that is, the Ashanti 
War of 1874] and the only proof he has ever given of civiliza- 
tion is to be found in the fact that he has engaged a London 
solicitor to advocate his interests.35 
Chamberlain was determined to subdue King Prempeh. The period of 
patience with the King had expired. Nothing else but complete military force 
would solve the issue. On November 8, 1895, Chamberlain wrote to the Prime 
Minister, Lord Salisbury, regarding the preparations for the Ashanti 
expedition: 
The War Office has, I believe, prepared its plans, and it is 
very desirable that everything should be got in readiness at 
once. I should like to have the matter finished if possible 
before the meeting of Parliament.36 
On November 11, 1895, the War Office was told to make necessary preparations 
for the impending conflict.37 Governor Maxwell was also instructed on what 
35 
Garvin, III, 22. 
36 
Ibid. 
37 
British Sessional Papers, 1896, LVIII, 835. 
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to do. 38 The stage was then set. The King's plea for negotiation was dis- 
missed. By December all plans were in readiness for the eventful debacle. 
In January, 1896, King Prempeh was attacked. His forces were no match for 
those of the Colonial Secretary and Maxwell. Consequently, the King sur- 
rendered and was forced to accept under duress "the protection of the Queen 
of England." This was not all; the continued presence of the King posed a 
serious threat to Britain's complete take-over of Ashanti and other regions 
of the hinterland. Hence, the King, his mother and some other members of his 
family were deported to the island of Seychelles (off the east coast of 
Africa). He remained a prisoner until 1924 when he was brought back; he was 
reinstated as the Paramount Chief of Kumasi in 1926. 
With the removal of King Prempeh, the way was now open for British 
penetration into the hinterland. Ashanti was annexed outright and a British 
Resident appointed at Kumasi in 1896. Treaties were concluded with native 
chiefs of the Northern Territories (north of Ashanti) and so the areas were 
proclaimed British Protectorates. 39 
As the British Government eventually gained access into the Gold Coast 
hinterland, British rule replaced native government. Attempts were made to 
restore order and peace. To all appearances, the country was now in peace 
under the new regime; beneath the surface, the country was seething with 
unrest. The Ashantis never took the bitter experience of foreign administra- 
tion with resignation. The extension of British authority in the hinterland 
had its repercussions on the economic life of the country. The economic life 
38 
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39 
Hertslet, I, 78. 
106 
40 
of the Gold Coast was largely determined by its political history. After 
the conquest of Ashanti, Chamberlain introduced his constructive program. 
Roads, railways, harbors, and waterways were constructed for the purpose of 
"giving an impetus to the trade of the Colony. "41 
The extensions of these systems of communication from the coast to the 
hinterland had two important effects. First,it led to the pushing of the 
"traders' frontier" which formerly hardly went beyond the River Prah. 
Second, it heralded the era of capitalistic exploitation. Prospectors and 
capitalists swarmed into the interior for land leases and mining concessions, 
thus leading to the new phenomenon of the "Gold Rush." Brackenbury, the 
Assistant Military Officer, had given an exaggerated account of the mineral 
resources of the land. "Gold is there in profusion, and to be had for the 
seeking." 42 Consequently he recommended: 
Let our Government prospect these mines; let acts be passed 
similar to those by which our railway companies are empowered 
to compel persons to sell their land at a fair price;...For 
if once the gold-mines were at work, there would be no further 
fear that the country would ever fall back into the hands of 
the Ashantis....43 
Gold mining in the Gold Coast received an increased stimulus after the 
Ashanti conquest of 1896. Chiefs were cajoled to sell common lands to 
British prospectors. The strangers who obtained mining concessions paid the 
40pim, 
44. 
4 1British Sessional Papers, 1896, LVIII, 810. "Gold Coast Annual 
Report." 
42 
Brackenbury, II, 351. 
43Ibid., 352. 
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chiefs one third of the proceeds (the abusa system). Unscrupulous chiefs 
then bartered their rights with careless abandon. 
44 
Companies were formed 
for the purpose of exploiting the mineral resources. In 1895, for instance, 
the Ashanti Gold-fields Corporation was formed under the prospector, Mr. E. 
A. Cade. Cade succeeded in securing extensive concessions--mining, trading, 
rubber and timber extraction, and town building. The influx of commercial 
and mining enterprise in the Gold Coast had serious results on the economic 
and social organization of the country. Competition in commerce resulted in 
the formation of trade combines which dangerously displaced native traders. 
Trade monopoly by the British replaced the hitherto native trade. As far 
back as 1881, The Gold Coast Times (native owned newspaper) had urged the 
people not to be passive onlookers at the operations of "our foreign 
friends....They only came to benefit themselves alone....The land is ours." 45 
Native attempts to form mining companies and so mine the gold directly failed 
for lack of adequate finance. Thus, British facilities in raising the 
capital virtually excluded native enterprise from the field. 
The Gold mining operation was not just a private concern. The British 
Government staked its interest, too. In 1897 Governor Maxwell was author- 
ized by the Colonial Secretary to spend JE1,000 on the gold mining industry 
and to use Chinese miners. 46 The proposal to use Chinese labor constituted 
44 
By 1912 the prices rose significantly. Payment per five square miles 
was between 4410-Al2 per annum. If machinery was installed the price rose 
tojE 300. See Kimble, 21, footnote 1. 
n<imble, 22, The Gold Coast Times, November 26, 1881. 
Kimble, 24. The suggestion to use Chinese labor for the mines was 
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a direct affront to the natives. On October 20, 1897, The Gold Coast Express 
protested: 
We do not want the 'celestials' in West Africa on any 
account....China is large enough surely for her own 
people.47 
The Governor, in any case, used the Chinese in spite of all protests. The 
Colonial Secretary did not allow private enterprise to go far enough to 
overshadow Government interest. In 1899 Mr. Cade wrote to Chamberlain 
suggesting that his Corporation take over all the metalliferous, timber, 
water, and rubber rights of Ashanti. He offered to pay 4 5,000 down and a 
furtherc 5,000,000 later. Chamberlain refused. He remarked, "Mr. Cade has 
48 
a low opinion of my intelligence. 
Chamberlain's "scientific" administration called for the extraction of 
taxes from the natives but not their participation in the government that 
vitally affected them. Direct taxes were imposed on the natives. The system 
of taxation was known as "hut tax." This meant the counting of the number of 
dwellings or houses (huts) and thus calculating the taxes accordingly. The 
but tax was very unpopular for the natives felt that "taxation and represen- 
tation should go hand in hand." To Governor Maxwell, consent or representa- 
tion was not a prerequisite for taxation. He refused to consult the Chiefs 
and in 1897 imposed a flat rate of five shillings (5s) per annum on the 
natives. Native resistance to any form of taxation was so strong that in 
1898 the draft of the House Tax Bill was shelved. The Governor did not 
47 Quoted in Kimble, 24. 
48Ibid., Minute of April 13, 1899, by Chamberlain in the Colonial 
Office regarding Cade's letter of March 25, 1899. 
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anticipate any serious resistance for, as he said, "the natives of the Gold 
Coast have the lightest taxation burden all over the world. "49 This showed 
his misjudgment of the situation. The natives protested not because the taxes 
were high but because they were a direct invasion of their independence. 
The but tax having failed, the Government decided to substitute it with 
customs duty tax--a ten per cent ad valorem duty on certain goods. To 
Chamberlain "no taxation means no improvement" and that would not be 
tolerated. The resentment was more from the merchants. The general 
resistance to any form of taxation sprang from the awareness that it was 
"an alien form of economic coercion resulting from the new political order." 50 
In 1900, Governor Hodgson who replaced Maxwell was determined to revive the 
direct tax in spite of the "recurring rows" of the people. He put forward 
two lines of actions taxes to be levied in Ashanti to recoup the expenses of 
the Government in Kumasi; the possession of the "Golden Stool" of Ashanti for, 
as he reasoned, the British Government could never completely subdue the 
Ashantis until the symbol of their nationhood was removed from them. When 
Governor Hodgson tried to implement his policy of taxing the people without 
their consent, another war broke out. The Governor and his forces were 
attacked by Ashanti troops who had been enraged by the Governor's action. On 
September 30, 1900, the Ashanti forces were crushingly defeated at Aboasa. 
The outcome of the defeat was the formal annexation of Ashanti. The 
administration of the country was placed under a Chief Commissioner. On 
49 
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September 26, 1901, the Ashanti Order in Council defined the limits of 
Ashanti and the Northern Territories. 51 The status symbols of office of 
King Prempeh were transferred to Queen Victoria. As she recorded in her 
Journal, "Lenchen, Christian, and Christie came to luncheon, and the latter 
gave me King Prempeh's umbrella, stool, and chair. "52 The Gold Coast was 
then under British administration until 1957 when she became independent. 
51 
See Hertslet, I, 77-78. 
52 
Buckle, The Letters of Queen Victoria. 3rd Series, III, 32. 
"Extracts from the Queen's Journal." 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
SIERRA LEONE AND GAMBIA 
Sierra Leone and the Gambia were the earliest British Colonies in West 
Africa, yet compared with Nigeria and the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the 
Gambia have received very little attention. Sierra Leone was the administra- 
tive headquarters or capital of the British West African Settlements. 
Sierra Leone was formerly a Portuguese colony. Towards the mid-sixteenth 
century the coastal peoples were invaded by Europeans of many nationalities. 
The slave trade attracted the Europeans to the vicinity of Sierra Leone where 
the trade in slaves was abundant. Although English merchants had established 
forts and trading stations in the early 1600's, it was only in 1788 that the 
British Government established a strong connection with Sierra Leone. In 
1787 the British Government acceded to the urgings of Granville Sharp, a 
British slave abolitionist, to ship the freed slaves in England to Sierra 
Leone. Sierra Leone then became the "Province of Freedom" for the "Black 
Poor." The British Government, with the support of private contributors and 
humanitarians financed the settlement of the "unwanted vagrants," and by the 
agreement of August 22, 1788, secured for the new settlers lands and protec- 
tion from King Nambaner, Chief of Sierra Leone. 
1 
The new settlers in Sierra Leone enjoyed a period of self-government 
for the "Protection and Preservation of their common Freedom" as their 
charter stated. But this was a temporary bonanza. In 1791 the private 
1 
Hertslet, I, 26. 
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investors who sponsored the settlement of the "Black Poor" demanded the 
control of the expenses of the settlers. Control of expenditure implied 
control of government. By Act of Parliament (1791) the Sierra Leone Company 
was incorporated and thirteen directors, including Granville Sharp, were 
empowered to govern the settlement as absentee governors. Consequently, the 
rule of the Company from 1791 to 1808 ended the self-governing "Province of 
Freedom" Sharp had envisioned. 2 
From 1788 Sierra Leone became, as Lord Salisbury said of it, "a Colony 
to which high value is attached."3 On account of financial difficulties, the 
Sierra Leone Company was relieved of its responsibilities by the British 
Government in 1808. On January 1, 1808, the Government took direct control 
of the settlement and proclaimed it a British Colony under the Governorship 
of T. P. Thompson. By an Act of Parliament of May 7, 1821, the Company 
transferred to the British Government "all the Forts, Possessions, and 
property then belonging to or held by them"4 By this Act, the British Govern- 
ment was invested with extensive rights on the West Coast of Africa "between 
the 20th degree of north latitude and 20th degree of south latitude." Sierra 
Leone, therefore, became a sphere of British influence. 
For many years the progress of trade in Sierra Leone was very slow. The 
deadly nature of the climate, lack of transport facilities and the hostility 
of the natives (aborigines) stifled trade. Coupled with these difficulties 
2 Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1962, 26. 
3British Sessional Papers, 1892, LVI, 777; Lord Salisbury to Lord 
Dufferin, March 30, 1892. 
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were the continued slave-raids in the interior of the colony. Hence the 
Colony was to remain little more than a chain of coastal settlements until 
1885. In 1885 the general policy of hinterland penetration was extended to 
Sierra Leone. On May 18, 1885, the boundary of the areas ceded by the native 
chiefs of Sierra Leone to the British Government, generally known as Gallinas 
Territory, was defined. Also on November 11, 1885, the boundary between 
Sierra Leone and the Republic of Liberia was clearly fixed so that the Brit- 
ish Government had a well-defined frontier in Sierra Leone. 
5 
With the fron- 
tiers delimited, the Government accelerated its policy of hinterland penetra- 
tion by making treaties with native chiefs, persuading them to accept British 
protection and thereby refusing to cede any portion of their territory to 
any other Power. The "peace begging" mission yielded handsome results to the 
British Government; many territories beyond the coast were absorbed into the 
existing Colony. 
British interior policy (both Liberals and Conservatives) met, as in 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast, with native resistance. Some inland towns 
rebuffed the "peace-begging" tactics of the British administrators as a 
calculated drive to obtain a strong foothold in the hinterland. One of the 
tribal chiefs, Chief Kondo of Yoni, distrusted the method of British expan- 
sion. In November, 1885, he attacked Songo Town, to which British influence 
had been extended; some British subjects were captured as slaves. Sir 
Samuel Rowe, the Governor of the Colony, appealed to the Colonial Office for 
armed force to deal with the Yonis. In the meantime, the Colonial Secretary 
(Lord Granville), was reluctant to authorize any military expedition into 
5 
Hertslet, I, 54; 57. 
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Sierra Leone. As Sierra Leone was a colonie de peuplement and not a colonie 
d'exploitation, Granville was moved by a "mawkish, hysterical humanitarian- 
ism," and so would not risk such an expedition. 6 The Sierra Leone administra- 
tion had been operating on a deficit. The strain of a military expedition 
would increase the insolvency of the Colony. So this matter of economy 
affected the Colonial Office's decisions. As Rowe was denied support from 
the Colonial Office for punitive action against the Yonis, he resorted to 
protracted peace negotiations. In 1886 a truce was signed between Chief 
Kondo and the British administration. 
The warfare suspended in 1886 was resumed later. The Yonis were still 
enraged by the British process of territorial absorption. Two towns which 
were under British protection, Mende and Temne, were threatened. The chief 
of Mende took the offensive against the Yonis but was restrained by Police 
Inspector Revington in order to avert a general war. An overture of peace 
was sent to the Chief of Yoni but it was rejected. 7 The basis of the rejec- 
tion was that the British government paid the other tribes to keep peace and 
so should pay the Yonis, too. Then came the debacle. In October, 1886, the 
Yonis attacked and killed some Creoles (descendants of the Negro settlers) 
and destroyed some neighboring towns. As these towns were held to be within 
British territory, the Colonial Office sanctioned a military expedition under 
Colonel Sir Francis de Winton, to punish the Yonis. In November, Winton left 
Freetown with some detachments of the First West India Regiment, a small 
naval force, and fifty policemen. The opponents of the Yonis naturally 
6 
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became Winton's allies. The Yonis were attacked; and, after days of 'looting 
and burning, the Yonis surrendered. Yoni rice-fields were destroyed and the 
forces were allowed to plunder at will. 
After the war, Kondo, the Yoni Chief, was removed and Le Masa was chosen 
as Bai Sherbro of Yoni. Those who were Yoni's allies were punished and some 
of the warriors deported to Elmina.8 As the Yoni resistance broke down, 
British administrators could introduce measures with careless disregard of 
popular feeling. In 1888, Governor Rowe decided to revive the House and Land 
Tax. The natives were determined never to submit to what they called "the 
height of Tyranny." As one of the Freetown (Capital of Sierra Leone) poets, 
J. T. MacFoy, put its 
No more taxations's paws 
On our beloved shores 
Shall e'er alight;... 9 
Exhausted and discouraged in his career in Sierra Leone, Governor Rowe died 
in 1888 without implementing his fiscal policy. In November, 1888, he was 
replaced by Sir James Hay as Governor. 
It was clearly recognized by the Sierra Leone Administration that the 
trade and prosperity of the country depended on the tranquility of the 
adjoining producing areas. For this reason, annual stipends were promised 
to chiefs of the hinterland in return for their protection of commerce and 
guarantee to keep the inland roads open. 10 One of the inland chieftains, 
Chief Mackiah, was charged with raiding one of the towns within the 
8 
Ibid., 476. 
9 Quoted in Ibid., 477. 
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jurisdiction of the British Government. Consequently, another military 
expedition was launched against Chief Mackiah's principal town, Fanimah. The 
capital city was destroyed, the chief captured and deported to Elmina, and 
peace restored. 
11 
With the removal of obstructionists and, in fact, the 
restoration of order and peace in the country, trade was encouraged, and the 
Colony's revenue increased considerably. The total value of exports in the 
Colony amounted to 319,719. 12 The administration was confident that 
greater results would be realized in the immediate future. 
Since 1882 the French and the British had clashed in Sierra Leone. 
Each tried to outdo the other in persuading the natives to sign treaties of 
protection. By 1887 French territorial claims in Sierra Leone were enormous. 
On August 10, 1889, the spheres of the French and the English in Sierra Leone 
were defined. This treaty is a part of the arrangement between the two Powers 
in regard to their possessions on the West Coast of Africa. 13 Territorial 
disputes continued to strain the relations of the French and the British. 
Not until 1904 did the two Powers have a definitive delimitation of their 
respective spheres of influence in Sierra Leone. France was allowed terri- 
tories to the north and Britain was ceded those in the south. Also there was 
a definitive demarcation between the British Colony of Sierra Leone and French 
Guinea. These arrangements were conducted by exchange of notes between the 
French Foreign Minister Paul Cambon and British Foreign Minister Lansdowne. 14 
11 
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The fear of French encroachments in Sierra Leone increased the tempo of 
British expansionist policy. In 1894, it was clear to the chiefs that the 
"peace-begging" days were over. Recalcitrant chiefs were punished or exiled 
by British administrators. In all but name, the whole country was a British 
Protectorate. Active British administration was felt in all walks of life. 
After demarcating the boundaries between the French and the British in 1895, 
the new Governor, Cardew,launched his "Railway Schemes in Sierra Leone." In 
introducing his railway scheme, Governor Cardew stated in his speech in May, 
1895: 
I am of the opinion that native products exist in large 
quantities, and only require cheap means of transport to 
reach the markets in Freetown or elsewhere.15 
In order to raise money for his construction program, Cardew introduced once 
again the hated but tax. As usual, there was rebellion and resentment every- 
where. Only with the help of the army and police were the people suppressed. 
In 1896, the country was proclaimed a British Protectorate and Cardew's 
project was continued in spite of native opposition until 1900. In the same 
year the country, in common with the other West African Colonies, was fully 
under British regime. It remained as a British Protectorate until 1961 when 
it became independent. 
For some years Sierra Leone and the Gambia were ruled under one govern- 
ment. In 1821 the Gambia was annexed to Sierra Leone, and in 1843 it was 
created as a separate colony with its own Governor. From 1866, however, the 
Gambia was governed again from Sierra Leone as a part of the government of 
the West African Settlements. It reverted to a separate administration 
1 5British Sessional Papers, 1895, LXXI, 66. "Colonial Report: Annual, 
1894-95." 
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in 1888. 
Of all the four British Colonies in West Africa, none experienced the 
same degree of indifference of the British Government to colonial expansion 
as the Gambia. For years it was a theater of conflict between the French 
and the British. The main attraction of the Gambia was the slave trade, 
but after the legal abolition of slavery in 1807, the prosperity of the 
country declined. Proposals to cede it to France for more prosperous 
territory elsewhere were made in Parliament. In 1870 Sir Arthur Kennedy, 
the Governor of the British West African Settlements recommended the cession 
of the Gambia to France. 
16 Such a suggestion was opposed by merchants, 
missionaries, some members of Parliament, and the natives of the Gambia as 
well. One of the prominent Gambian chiefs, King Tomani Bojang of Kombo, 
wrote to the Queen asking that she "return my territory back to me as an act 
of friendship" rather than "transfer your settlements to another person." 
17 
Because of stiff opposition and France's unwillingness to pay the price, the 
proposal was dropped. 
In 1881, Dr. Goulsbury, the chief administrator of the country, headed 
an expedition designed to ascertain the commercial value of the Colony. His 
report offered no commercial prospects in the Gambia. 
18 
It was this lack of 
commercial incentive that made the British Government allow the tinkering of 
spheres in the Gambia in an attempt to secure better terms from France in 
16 
Lady Southorn, The Gambia. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1952, 174. 
Lady Southorn was the wife of Sir Thomas Southorn, the Governor of the Gambia, 
1936-1942. 
7Quoted in ibid. 
18 
Cf. Henry Fenwick Reeve, The Gambia. London: John Murray, 1912, 103. 
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Egypt and Newfoundland. 19 This attitude of seeming indifference to the Gambia 
came to an end in 1895 when,"thus far and no further" cession of territory 
initiated by Joseph Chamberlain came into operation. 
As was the case with the other West African colonies, British administra- 
tors in the Gambia started treaty-making campaigns with the peoples of the 
hinterland. By 1887 the British Government had established her sovereignty in 
many of the hinterland towns. 
20 
Samuel Rowe, the Governor of the West 
African Settlements, was instrumental in the hoisting of the English flag in 
many of the towns. In the same year, too, the French flag was hoisted in 
certain towns of the Gambia. On November 28, 1888, Letters Patent were 
issued declaring the Gambia a separate Colony to be called "the Colony of the 
Gambia." 21 The Gambia was therefore made a distinct colony from Sierra Leone. 
As French pin-pricks reached exasperating proportions, a delimitation arrange- 
ment was signed on August 10, 1889, between England and France. By Articles 
I and II British possessions in Gambia were defined. 
22 
Whenever and wherever the British Government tried to carry out its 
interior policy, it was frequently met by opposition from obstreperous 
indigeneous chieftains. In 1891. two hinterland chiefs, Fodi Kabba and Fodi 
Silla, opposed British and French delimitation of their country and British 
19 
Whenever the question of the Newfoundland Fisheries and Egypt were 
revived, discussed, and buried by England and France, the ghost of the cession 
of the Gambia to France stalked across the British political stage. 
20Hertslet, I, 18-19. 
21 
Ibid., 20. 
22 
Ibid., II, 729. Further territorial adjustments were made in 1891, 
1895-6, 1898-9. The final ratification of boundary arrangements was done in 
1904 by the Anglo-French Convention of the same year (April 8, 1904). 
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movement into the interior. The chiefs' forces attacked British officials. 
The chiefs were routed by a combined naval and military expedition. Tempor- 
ary peace was then maintained. 
The peace treaty signed in 1891 was but a makeshift arrangement. In 
1892 Chief Fodi Silla resisted British entry into his territory. To make the 
matter worse, he continued the chronic slave-raiding up country. He was 
definitively defeated by the West India Regiment and deported to St. Louis 
(French territory) where he died. After Chief Fodi Silla's defeat, his 
territory was incorporated into the British possessions in the Gambia. In 
1894, the Gambia was declared a British Protectorate. 
The final straw came in 1900. In that year Chief Fodi Kabba and some 
of his intransigent allies resisted continued British penetration. The 
the village of Sankandi which was friendly 
with the British Government. On June 14, 1900, two British Commissioners, 
Mr. F. C. Sitwell and M. F. E. Silva, proceeded to the village with Sergeant 
Joseph Cox and some police force. They summoned the Chief to a meeting. 
The Chief refused to come. When Sitwell tried to arrest the chief, his men 
fired at the Commissioners and killed both of them and some others. No 
reprisals were taken until March, 1901, when a sufficient force was 
recruited. Chief Fodi Kabba's territory was invaded, he was shot and killed 
and his forts and capital city were demolished. His supporters were executed 
and some exiled to Sierra Leone. As usual, the story was, that, "the death 
of Fodi Kabba and the punishment of the criminals brought to an end the 
opposition to the new order by the few intransigent elements in the Gambia."2 3 
23 
Lady Southorn, 197. 
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By 1903 British administrators had unchallenged sway in the Protectorate. 
Their enemies, except the bees, were completely subjugated. 
CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
In this short survey, the chief concern of the author has been to 
examine the process of British entry into the hinterland and the ultimate 
establishment of political authority over the West African Colonies. From 
the various cases treated in earlier chapters, it is evident that British 
penetration into West Africa was not by wholesome consent; on the contrary, 
the period 1885-1900 was fraught with "primary resistance." Prior to 1885 
the West African natives had effectively prevented "European invasion of 
their territories and of their politics." Such effective resistance "lasted 
so long as Africans had the equipment, the means, and the numbers to maintain 
their independence." 1 Two developments, however, "weakened or overcame this 
barrier to penetration." As Coleman put it: 
One was the decline in the power of the semimilitary coastal 
kingdoms which resulted from revolutionary economic changes, 
as well as other internal developments. The other was the 
decision of the British government in 1885 to support a more 
determined and systematic penetration of the interior which 
was to culminate, fifteen years later, in the establishment 
of a formal protectorate supported and controlled by British 
force. 2 
The natives surrendered their lands under duress. British decision to 
penetrate the interior was the result of a number of forces: international 
squabble over spheres of influence, economic factors brought about by the 
1Dike, 10. 
2 
Coleman, 170. 
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Industrial Revolution, and others. To explain British determination to 
extend its colonial frontier in 1885 purely as an economic expedient would 
be a facile and misleading interpretation. Trade was a factor but it was 
more of a means rather than an end. "Peaceful penetration," "facility for 
trade," "pacification," and other shibboleths are terms used to gloss over 
the real essence of British policy in West Africa. The over-riding urge of 
British agents from 1885-1900 was to secure for the Home Government political 
dominion over the West African Colonies. Many of the British administrators 
pursued this task of acquiring vital regions for Britain "with a single- 
mindedness that amounted at times to an obsession." 
Commercial companies as well as individual merchants were equally 
politically minded in their enterprise in West Africa. They realized that 
political authority over the territories implied control of the commerce and 
the resources of the interior. For this reason they frequently invented 
reasons that called for the annexation of the colonies and for the replace- 
ment of moral influence by authority. As Englishmen they dreamed of a far- 
flung emperium. As Goldie affirmed, his company was not "actuated by purely 
commercial motives"; the members were, he said, "Englishmen first and inves- 
tors afterwards." 
3 
In other words, the crux of British decision to go into 
the interior of the West Coast was, in Chamberlain's honest confession, "the 
expansion of the Empire." 
4 
The policy, no doubt, was adopted because of "a 
prospect of good" in the future. Political control was the best means of 
3 
F.0. 84/1879, Goldie to the Foreign Office, May 15, 1885. "The Lower 
Niger." 
4 
Boyd, I, 344-345, Chamberlain's Speech in the House of Commons, March 
20, 1893, "Pegging Claims for Posterity." 
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realizing the goal. To quote Lord Salisbury: 
By breaking down the resistance system of the native 
middlemen, colonial agents have given an important impulse 
to trade, which is evinced by the growing interest of the 
Chamber of Commerce.5 
British rule in West Africa was not only authoritarian, which implied 
the imposing of rules and regulations on the subject peoples, it was equally 
paternalistic. 6 The natives were considered as inferior beings who were to 
be treated as the administrators thought fit. Hence, in the governments 
that vitally concerned them, African natives were excluded until late. It 
was not until after 1900 that African members were elected to the Legislative 
Councils. Between 1885 and 1900, the doors of the Legislative Councils 
remained closed to African members except those who were "mere tools" of the 
Government. The Governor of the Gold Coast, Mr. Brandford Griffith, for 
instance, felt it was impolitic to yield to "the narrow-minded and intensely 
selfish ideas" of the natives in preference to "the broad, enlightened, 
straightforward and liberal views" of Englishmen. 
7 
It could therefore be 
seen that: 
Colonial governments are not democratic governments. They 
are not based on consent. Each is the embodiment of the power 
of an alien country. A colonial government demands obedience; 
its laws must be obeyed. Those who represent the metropolitan 
country are top administrators and lawgivers, not subject to 
the will of those whom they rule. They require not that their 
5British Sessional Papers, 1892, LVI, 778, Lord Salisbury to Lord 
Dufferin, March 30, 1892. 
6 
Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa. Evanston, 
Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1959, 75. Cohen was the former 
Head of the African Division of the Colonial Office. 
7 
C.O. 96/202, Minute of November 5, 1889, by Brandford Griffith. 
125 
colonial subjects acquiesce, but that they submit. 
8 
It is easy at times to overlook or undervalue the importance of British 
penetration in West Africa. One of the misleading political formulas pre- 
sented by the British Government as a rationale for the West African advance 
was the pacification of the territories and the civilization of the natives. 
British commitment in West Africa, Chamberlain told the House of Commons in 
1893, was "to take our share in the work of civilization." 
9 
To be sure, 
British administrators contributed immensely to the creation of peace and 
order out of chaos and confusion. They helped to stop intertribal wars that 
were quite endemic in West Africa, to stop the nefarious slave traffic and 
human sacrifices and other barbarous customs. These humanitarian activities 
redound to the honor of the British. On the other hand, however, "Pax 
Britannica" was almost immediately followed by "Jus Britannica." While it 
would not be easy to establish the fact that this was a British modus operandi 
for achieving political authority, the truth remains that the collapse of the 
existing native institution (slavery) had serious repercussions on the 
authority and power of hitherto native chiefs and kings. As their power, 
wealth and authority rested on the continuance of the native customs, the 
abolition of these customs meant, in fact, a political demise of the chiefs 
resulting in the British officials filling the vacuum of power. 
A noted authority on Africa, Margery Perham, impressed perhaps by what 
the British had done in West Africa during their penetration stated: 
8K. A. Busia, The Challenge of Africa. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1962, 67. 
9 
Boyd, I, 345. 
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Until the recent penetration by Britain the greater part of 
the continent was without the wheel, the plough or transport- 
animal; almost without stone houses or clothes, except for 
skins; without writing and so without history. Mentally as 
well as physically the West Africans were helpless before 
British intrusion.1° 
This implies, as Professor Craig seemed to affirm, that "without colonization 
and the benefits it brought, the people of West Africa ...would not have been 
able to rise, as they have in our day, to the position of self-government." 
11 
Such arguments, although with some iota of truth, do not portray the true 
picture. In most cases "results are cited in explanation of original motives 
with which they have no connection at the time of action." 
12 
The improvements 
that were made in the colonial countries were in most cases incidental and 
not the primary motive for penetration. The building of railways, roads, 
harbors, and other utilities were undertaken to facilitate trade and political 
administration; nor did the British administrators ever think that such 
benefits were designed for the people. British penetration into West Africa 
was a purposeful policy, carefully designed for the extension of British 
political authority, and the reaping thereby of the economic benefits that 
accompanied political control. Whatever was not advantageous to the Home 
Government was never proposed by the local administrators. 
Both economic and educational schemes were introduced into the protec- 
torates. Prior to 1900 there were few industries established by the British 
10 
Margery Perham, "The British Problem in Africa," Foreign Affairs, New 
York: Foreign Relations, October 1950-July 1951, 29:638. 
11 Gordon Craig, Europe Since 1815. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
1962, 445. 
12 
Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1958, 310. 
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directly. In the Gold Coast the cocoa industry was established under native 
initiative. In 1879 a Fanti laborer, Tete Oluasshi, smuggled several cocoa 
beans from San Thome, a Portuguese colony. He eventually established a small 
cocoa plantation at Mampong. 13 As the venture proved successful, Governor 
Griffith in 1887 procured cocoa pods from San Thome and distributed them to 
natives of Akwapim district. Under government encouragement the cocoa enter- 
prise became the chief export industry of the Gold Coast and has remained 
such till this day. In Nigeria, too, cocoa plantations were introduced by 
David Henshaw. 
As for education, very few schools were built. Those who were educated 
were mainly educated in mission schools. It was because of this base of mass 
illiteracy that British administrators excluded native elements from the 
administrative circles. As a Nigerian politician pithily said, "if Britain 
would wage war against these demons [ignorance and poverty] with the same 
grim determination and despatch as she fought against Hitler ...she would 
have made a vital and lasting contribution to world peace. H14 Until after 
1900 there were no serious steps taken to formulate an educational policy 
designed for the raising of the standard and efficiency of the bulk of the 
people. In all cases, officialdom in the protectorates was "indifferent if 
not opposed to higher education" for the people. The British administrators 
were content merely with the production of a "cult of detribalized clerks,"-- 
semieducated recorders who had hardly any academic training whatsoever. 
The educational policy of the mother-country left more to be desired. 
13 
McPhee, 40. 
14 
Chief Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom, London: Faber, 1946, 37. 
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Until 1900 education was under the direct control of missionaries. They 
controlled practically ninety-nine per cent of the schools. "To all intents 
and purposes the school is the Church....An appreciation of this fact is 
cardinal in all considerations of African education." 15 British educational 
policy in West Africa has been the target of pungent criticism. To quote 
Coleman: 
As to content, the schools equipped the African with little 
more than an elementary knowledge of the English language for 
an economic future in which a senior clerkship was the upper 
limit of his permissible advancement. In terms of need and 
desire, there were hundreds of candidates for every school 
vacancy .16 
As economic exploitation of the mineral and other resources of West 
Africa began actively after 1900, their examination falls beyond the purview 
of this study. Throughout the entire work, much stress has been placed on 
the establishment of British political power in West Africa. Political 
control of the colonies was inevitable if free trade (amidst strong native 
opposition) was to be a reality. No such political authority could be 
exerted so long as the native chiefs and kings remained entrenched in power. 
The practical alternative for the British Government to realize its objective 
was to remove by force of arms those chiefs and kings who constituted a 
formidable impediment to the achievement of the desired goal. From cases so 
far examined in this work, it is clear that the only way to achieve the 
political objective of those who shaped the national policy was to whittle 
down all opposition and resistance. In short, the over-emphasized premise 
15 
Coleman, 113, quoted from A. Victor Murray, The School in the Bush, 
London, 1929, 65. 
16 
Ibid., 116. 
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that British penetration into West Africa from 1885 to 1900 was motivated 
primarily by desire for trade, conspicuously overlooks the political impli- 
cations of such a penetration. Facility for trade was but a rationale; it 
does not explain the primary motive. Political control of the colonies was 
the crux of the whole venture; it was a necessity if full access to the 
markets, natural and mineral resources of the colonies, was to be had. 
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Appendix A 
Treaty Between the Royal Niger Company and Native Chiefs, Form No. 5 
We, the undersigned Chiefs of , with the view to bettering of 
the condition of our country and people, do this day cede to the Royal Niger 
Company (Chartered and Limited), for ever, the whole of our territory 
extending from 
We also give to the said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited) 
full power to settle all native disputes arising from any cause whatever, and 
we pledge ourselves not to enter into any war with any other tribes without 
the sanction of the said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited). 
We understand that the said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and 
Limited) have full power to mine, farm, and build in any portion of our 
country. 
We bind ourselves not to have any intercourse with any strangers or 
foreigners except through the said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and 
Limited). 
In consideration of the foregoing, the said Royal Niger Company 
(Chartered and Limited) bind themselves not to interfere with any of the 
native laws or customs of the country, consistent with the maintenance of 
order and good government. 
The said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited) agree to pay native 
owners of land a reasonable amount for any portion they may require. 
The said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited) bind themselves to 
protect the said Chiefs from the attacks of any neighboring aggressive tribes. 
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The said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited) also agree to pay 
the said Chiefs measure native value. 
We, the undersigned witnesses, do hereby solemnly declare that the 
Chiefs whose names are placed opposite their respective crosses have in our 
presence affixed the crosses of their free will and consent, and that the 
said has in our presence affixed his signature. 
Done in triplicate at , this day of 188 . 
Declaration by Interpreter. 
, of , do hereby solemnly declare 
that I am well acquainted with the language of the country, and 
that on the day of , 188 , I truly and faithfully explained 
the above Agreement to all the Chiefs present, and that they understood its 
meaning. 
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In this attempt to describe British colonial policy in West Africa from 
1885-1900, the author has two main objectives. First, to give a brief back- 
ground of the pattern of British entry into West Africa. Second, to examine 
the pattern of British extension of political authority from the coast to the 
hinterland. 
The area known as West Africa extends from the River Senegal on the 
northwest of Africa to the Cameroons on the southeast. The four British 
colonies in West Africa were the Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast (now 
Ghana), and Nigeria. Except the Gambia, all the others are now independent. 
These countries are not a compact or uniform unit. On the contrary, they 
are separated from one another by wedges of territory which belong to either 
France or Portugal. 
British connection with West Africa dates to the sixteenth century when 
Great Britain joined other European Powers in the scramble for slave trade. 
British merchants succeeded in displacing the other merchants and so became 
the dominant dealers in the slave traffic. As the British flag generally 
followed trade, the British Government formally acquired the four countries 
as British colonies: the Gambia (1765), Sierra Leone (1808), Gold Coast 
(1808), and Lagos, Nigeria (1861). 
Prior to 1885, British influence in West Africa was limited to the 
coast. Trade between the British merchants (as well as other European 
merchants) and the peoples of the interior was transacted through middlemen. 
The middlemen were chiefs or prominent native businessmen who brought the 
articles of trade from the interior and sold them to the overseas merchants 
at the coast. This system was popularly known as the "Coast System." During 
this period, the British Government adopted a policy of advance by commercial 
2 
enterprise and moral influence. Commercial companies were formed for the 
purpose of trade. These, especially the Royal Niger Company, succeeded in 
laying the foundations for the future British political administration in the 
colonies. British Consuls who were stationed at important trading centers 
were to use their weapon of moral influence in persuading the native chiefs 
to open up trade and to make treaties which would place them under British 
protection. Many treaties were signed between the natives and the Government 
officials thus establishing British influence on the coastal fringes of the 
colonies. Attempts of the British to penetrate into the interior were foiled 
by strong native resistance. 
A new era opened in 1885. This crucial year marked the historic "rape 
of Africa." British merchants demanded direct trade with the natives of the 
interior. "We do not approve of the policy of waiting," they said, "till the 
traders of the interior come down to us." Between 1882 and 1885, West Africa 
became the arena of international rivalry over spheres of influence. The 
Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, called by Chancellor Bismarck of Germany, 
provided a modus vivendi for the Europeans in West Africa. The General Acts 
of the Conference provided for the preservation of the existing rights of 
each European Power in West Africa and the notification to other Powers of 
the effective occupation of the territories thus claimed. 
In response to the feverish international rivalry and the pressure from 
the members of the Liberal Cabinet who supported an active interior policy in 
West Africa, Gladstone's Liberal Government declared the four colonies as 
British Protectorates by Orders in Council of March 26, 1885. The British 
Government's decision to advance into the interior was not primarily for the 
purpose of trade; it was fundamentally political--to extend its political 
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authority beyond the coast and so assume full political control of the 
colonies. 
To implement this new "forward policy," the Government called to a halt 
the existing "pacific policy" of advance by trade and moral influence. It 
adopted an aggressive policy of removing native chiefs and kings who resisted 
British penetration into the hinterland. To effect the removal of the hither- 
to native rulers, the British Government, under either the Liberal or the 
Conservative Governments, used military force. In 1900, British political 
authority and administration became an accomplished fact. The creation of 
the British West African Protectorates, as they came to be called in 1900, 
was not by consent of the native peoples but by conquest. 
In conclusion, the British Government in 1885 adopted a policy of 
transforming influence into authority in West Africa. It achieved its goal 
in 1900 by establishing political control over the four colonies and thus 
replacing indigeneous administration by British administration. 
